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Sociocultural factors of national (in)stability of Ukrainian society in wartime¹

Introduction

In spite of sociocultural divisions of the present-day Ukrainian society by Ukrainian / Russian language preferences, European / Eurasian geocultural and geopolitical choices of its citizens, Ukraine had been showing sufficient national resilience during more than 20 years since gaining independence in 1991. Compared to a number of

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Eastern European and post-Soviet countries, it was a very positive example of peaceful functioning of a socioculturally divided and politically unstable, postcolonial and post-Communist society. In 1991–2014, existence of socioculturally heterogeneous Ukraine seemed an exception from general historic tendency of conflicting / peaceful dissolution of polyethnic and/or polycultural societies and formation on their territories of more monoethnic and/or monocultural societies in South-East and Central Europe. And, under conditions of more favourable and non-aggressive foreign political surroundings, Ukraine probably would have been establishing its national resilience steadily and peacefully, just like Belgium, Spain, Great Britain, and Canada did, having partially similar sociocultural divisions and rifts. But, since the very declaration of Ukraine's independence, this desired progress of national establishment was being violated by permanent information-psychological, and after two decades, armed military aggression by Russia.

At the moment, sociocultural rifts in present-day Ukrainian society occasionally transform under war conditions into hotbeds of uncompromising confrontation. There is no lack of cases when Ukrainian citizens collaborate with Russian intelligence agencies, relaying confidential information to them or revealing locations of Ukrainian military and strategic facilities which become targets of Russian subsequent missile and drone strikes. Not long ago it was Ukrainian citizens who personally committed terrorist murders of public figure I. Farion and politician and statesman A. Parubiy. Manifestations of such radical disloyalty of a certain group of citizens towards Ukrainian society and state show that in the years of the Russo-Ukrainian war the aforementioned sociocultural divisions, rifts, or cleavages did not disappear. Thus, there is a need to articulate the notions about their manifestations and also to attempt to evaluate the potential risks they generate for Ukraine's wartime national resilience.

Symptoms of the aforementioned sociocultural rifts had been repeatedly observed in the past three decades. In particular, tendencies towards sociocultural division were pointed out in the research of sociocultural dynamics of political regions of Ukraine in 1994–2006 (Vyshniak, 2006). As a result of this research, deep sociocultural divisions between the Ukrainian regions were pointed out based on the attitudes towards the status of Russian language and towards Ukraine's geocultural European versus Eurasian choice. In similar fashion, Ukrainian citizens were geopolitically divided based on their attitude towards Ukraine becoming a member of NATO. One of the manifestations of these divisions were different, or even polar opposite, attitudes of the citizens towards modernizations of the principles of social order in present-day Ukraine (Reznik, 2017). Ultimately, in 2000–2018 proponents of the upgrade of the status of Russian language and Eurasian geopolitical choice mostly viewed the existing social order of the present-day Ukrainian society as an illegitimate mess (Reznik, 2019). As a result of the Russian military aggression, the state of Ukraine lost control over a number of its internationally recognized regions along with the localized regional and territorial communities, which, in part, affected the quantitative proportion of different sociocultural preferences in mass conscience (Reznik, 2022). Quantitative balance between potential participants of the aforementioned sociocultural divisions changes, as well as, in part, the measure of radicality of their attitudes. At first, the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine strengthened greatly the process of solidarization of

its citizens despite unabolishable sociocultural divisions between them (Reznik, 2023a,b). But in the following years of the full-scale war an immense destructive potential of these sociocultural divisions, tensions, and cleavages had not run out and persisted (Reznik, 2024). Even now the scientific discourse lacks the empirically grounded evaluations of the influence of factors of various sociocultural divisions, tensions, and cleavages on the national resilience of Ukrainian society under the war conditions. This article presents an attempt of such an empirical evaluation.

Conceptual grounds of empirical analysis

Presently, it was noted that the notion of national resilience is not well-established (Dembitskyi, 2025: p. 15). In particular, in the discourse of social and behavioral sciences the phrase “national resilience” is used in the titles of English-language scientific works (Canetti et al., 2014; Kimhi et al., 2017). Generally, Ukrainian sociologists also follow this approach while studying Ukraine’s national resilience from the perspective of public opinion and state of the society (Golovakha et al., 2022). Therewith, in general sociological theory, which T. Parsons developed at one time, the notion of social system’s stability is used, which can be considered a partial theoretical analogue of the notion of resilience: the general scientific term of “stability” may be translated into Ukrainian both literally («стабільність», “stabilnist”) and as “resilience” («стійкість», “stijkist”).

Parsons began to analyze the problem of social stability of society back in his pre-war work “Structure of Social Action” (1937). Among other things, he noted that the sociocultural factor of faith, that is religious beliefs in a broad sense, was necessary for social stability (Parsons, 1949: p. 278). Parson’s later wartime work “Propaganda and Social Control” (1942) considers stability of social systems as various interdependent function structures and processes of good-natured interactions of individuals-actors within society boundaries. From this perspective, every social system strives to maintain its own relative stability and independence from its environment, a social one in particular. Thus, integration of various system elements on the cultural level is seen as having a very high functional value for the stability of social systems (Parsons, 1954: p. 148), since the manifestations of tension and disorganization are potentially present in all complex social systems and can lead to their high instability.

The problem of social stability was thoroughly developed in Parson’s post-war work “The Social System” (1951). It stressed the stability and orderliness of interactions of the set of various actors as a way of socially-system organization. Institutional integration of social system on the basis of internalization by various actors of shared value models within it was recognized as one of the preconditions of these stability and orderliness (Parsons, 1964: p. 52). Collective beliefs in the area of the “supernatural”, that is, religious beliefs and expressive symbolics based on those, were viewed as another important factor of the stability of the social system (Parsons, 1964: p. 397). At the same time, stability of the social system was thought to also depend on the integration of interests of various actors into a stable and predictable structure of the process of their interaction: in the absence of this integration, the conflicts between such incompatible interests would inevitably threaten the stability of the social system.

In a collective work “Toward a General Theory of Action” (1951) Parsons and his co-author continued developing the idea that value orientations of various subjects within a social system must be integrated to a certain extent in order to make it stable. Other very important determinants of stability in the social system, from their point of view, are consensuses present within it concerning its instrumental ideas and symbols (Parsons & Shils, 1962: p. 24). Integration and harmonization of various cultural components of the social system enables its stability as orderliness and predictability of interactions of various actors within it. Thus, social systems like large societies can be stable if based on institutionalized common values, to which their members must be truly devoted and to which they must adhere in their actions (Parsons & Shils, 1962: p. 179). But the ideal harmonization of values, as well as their complete institutionalization in any given society, was not considered possible (Parsons & Shils, 1962: p. 231). Thus, sociocultural integration of all real social systems, including national societies, was seen as imperfect, and the fundamental potential of their instability unremovable.

Two decades later, Parsons noted primary hotbeds of national instability within sociocultural realms of modern pluralistic societies. Various sociocultural grounds of structural pluralism of the modern societies can become sources of their deep cleavages, and modern institutions of citizenship and political nation can facilitate that. Particular danger was seen in a situation when a number of the following structural-pluralistic preconditions of sociocultural disintegration of society coincide: “...The institutions of citizenship and nationality can nevertheless render the societal community vulnerable if the bases pluralism is exacerbated into sharply structured cleavages. Since the typical community unifies a large population over a large territory, for example, its solidarity may be severely strained by regional cleavages. This is particularly true where the regional cleavages coincide with ethnic and/or religious divisions. Many modern societies have disintegrated before varying combinations of these bases of cleavage” (Parsons, 1971: p. 22). When regional, ethnic, and religious identities prove more meaningful, preferred, and legitimate than civil nation-wide identity, the society becomes socioculturally polarized, fragmented, and divided. Primary integration strains associated with it become an existential challenge to the national resilience/stability of modern polycultural societies which they cannot always adequately address and thus survive.

All in all, the specific sociological notion of social stability was substantively developed in Parson's works before, during and after WWII, at the height of the Cold War, thus it partially reflects the experience of theoretical conceptualization of the USA society's participation in these global events. Thus, Parson's concept of social stability can also serve as a foundation for the analysis of the problem of national resilience of the present-day Ukrainian society under war conditions.

Empirical data and statistical methods of its analysis

The empirical base for the analysis in the article is the data set from the mass survey of sociological monitoring “Ukrainian Society” conducted in 2024 by Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine. The data gathering was conducted by the Rating Sociological Group on commission by the United States Agency for International Development

(USAID). Sample $N = 4101$ and represents adult population of Ukraine using smartphones; exceptions are the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and temporarily occupied territories of Donbas; weighing performed according to demographic structure present at the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war (Dembitskyi & Glomoza, 2024: p. 16). Field stage of the survey: June 27 – July 6, 2024. Survey design: 1) CATI (engagement of the respondents into the survey, social-demographic block); 2) CAWI (main part of the questionnaire) (Dembitskyi & Glomoza, 2024: p. 16). Sample error: 1.5% with confidence probability 95%. Empirical analysis was based on using methods of correlation, dispersion, factor, cluster, and set-regression analysis.

Basic sociocultural divisions

Based on the data from the sociological monitoring by the Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, language and geopolitical preferences of the Ukrainians can be analyzed. In particular, the distribution of responses to the question “What language (languages) do you mainly speak with your family members (at home)?” in 2024 is worth noting: option “Mainly Ukrainian” was chosen by 53.1% of the respondents, option “Mainly Russian” – 12.7%, option “Both Ukrainian and Russian (depending on the circumstances)” – 31.3%, option “Other” – 2.8% of the respondents. The share of citizens who use mainly Ukrainian in their family life is only 9% greater than the cumulative share of the citizens who use mainly or situationally Russian in their family life. Most probably, it is exactly between the representatives of these separate language categories that the numerous cases of interpersonal conflicts are reported in mass media on the grounds of public use of Russian language under conditions of Russian aggression. Social tension between these groups of citizens with alternative language practices can potentially escalate into an intense conflict and lead to nationwide destabilization of the society.

An association can be observed between preferred speaking language in the family and sympathy or unsympathy towards increasing the status of Russian language in Ukraine (Table 1).

Table 1

Association between speaking language in the family and opinion towards the need to grant Russian language status of an official language in Ukraine (2024, %*)

<i>Do you think Russian language needs to be granted an official language status in Ukraine?</i>	<i>What language (languages) do you mainly speak with your family members (at home)?</i>				Total
	Mainly Ukrainian	Mainly Russian	Both Ukrainian and Russian (depending on the circumstances)	Other (write)	
	<i>n</i> = 2178	<i>n</i> = 522	<i>n</i> = 1285	<i>n</i> = 116	<i>N</i> = 4101
No	93.1	45.4	70.5	93.1	80.0
Hard to say	5.7	21.8	20.9	3.4	12.5
Yes	1.2	32.8	8.6	3.4	7.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Association measures: $\chi^2 = 898.213$; $df = 6$; $p < 0.001$; Cramér's $V = 0.331$ ($p < 0.001$).

Citizens with predominantly Russian-speaking family environments are most inclined to support granting Russian language status of an official language in Ukraine, while citizens with predominantly Ukrainian-speaking family environments are almost absolutely not inclined towards it. Although, at the moment even among the citizens with predominantly Russian-speaking family environment the share of those who object to the need to grant Russian language such status in Ukraine is greater. The primary cause here also was the Russian occupation of a large portion of Ukrainian South after full-scale military action against Russia began in 2022. A significant share of the citizens with predominantly Russian-speaking family environment found themselves on the occupied territory, and thus they are not duly represented in the population and sample of the 2024 monitoring survey. At the same time, we cannot rule out a possibility that despise towards Russian invaders after their open military aggression in 2014 and its ultimate upscaling in 2022 could also affect the citizens' Russian-speaking preferences negatively.

The stronger inclination of the citizens with predominantly Russian-speaking family environments to support increasing the status of Russian language in Ukraine can be explained by the fact that the language in general is considered not just means of communication, but also sort of a marker of social status, power, and collective memory of the society. In particular, P. Bourdieu considered language as a symbolic linguistic capital and an attribute of a symbolic power in society. From this perspective, Russian language, which in Soviet times was the legitimate state language of the Russian Empire and the USSR, which included Ukraine, had a privileged social status, comprised extremely high symbolic capital, gave its native speakers major social-structure advantages, and was associated with social success, education, and career. Instead, Ukrainian language, both in the Russian Imperial and Soviet times, was socially devalued, had its public use partially limited, or was marginalized as strictly "household" or "rural" language.

The family environment language, with which a person socializes in their family, conditions their basic cultural identification, becomes a base of their identity, and forms their feelings of language comfort in public space. Thus, for the citizens with predominantly Russian-speaking family environments, Russian language is native and familiar, and the increase of its status in society means symbolic recognition of Russian-speaking identity and, probably, seems like a renewal of familiar historical symbolic language order when Russian-speaking was privileged. On the other hand, for the citizens with predominantly Ukrainian-speaking family environment, for whom the Ukrainian language is the primary marker of their cultural autonomy, the increase of status of Russian language is felt rather like a threat of displacement of the Ukrainian language, return to the situation of historic asymmetry and inequality of statuses of these two languages both in Russian Imperial and Soviet times. Another inevitable factor is association of Russian language with imperial politics of the Russian Federation after 1991 aimed at denying Ukrainian subjectiveness, and with escalation of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.

Likewise, the aforementioned war circumstances were inevitably reflected in geopolitical preferences, which are relatively closely associated with the language preferences of the Ukrainian citizens (Tables 2, 3).

Table 2

Association between opinion towards the need to grant Russian language status of an official language in Ukraine and attitude towards Ukraine joining the European Union (2024, %*)

How do you feel about Ukraine joining the European Union?	Do you think Russian language needs to be granted an official language status in Ukraine?			Total
	Yes	Hard to say	No	
	<i>n</i> = 311	<i>n</i> = 511	<i>n</i> = 3279	<i>N</i> = 4101
Rather negative	43.4	17.4	8.6	12.3
Hard to say	17.0	30.9	11.5	14.3
Rather positive	39.5	51.7	79.9	73.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Association measures: $\chi^2 = 509.605$; $df = 4$; $p < 0.001$; $\gamma = 0.575$ ($p < 0.001$; asymptotic mean square error = 0.023).

Table 3

Association between opinion towards the need to grant Russian language status of an official language in Ukraine and attitude towards Ukraine joining NATO (2024, %*)

How do you feel about Ukraine joining NATO?	Do you think Russian language needs to be granted an official language status in Ukraine?			Total
	Yes	Hard to say	No	
	<i>n</i> = 311	<i>n</i> = 511	<i>n</i> = 3279	<i>N</i> = 4101
Rather negative	55.3	23.7	7.5	13.1
Hard to say	13.8	32.9	14.3	16.6
Rather positive	30.9	43.4	78.2	70.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Association measures: $\chi^2 = 788.495$; $df = 4$; $p < 0.001$; $\gamma = 0.657$ ($p < 0.001$; asymptotic mean square error = 0.019).

The overwhelming majority of the citizens who do not support status promotion of Russian language in Ukraine, feel positive about Ukraine becoming a member of the European Union and NATO. On the other hand, more than half of the citizens inclined to support the increase of status of Russian language in Ukraine, feel negative about Ukraine becoming a member of NATO. Also, citizens who favor granting Russian language state language status divided almost in half along positive and negative attitudes towards Ukraine becoming a member of the European Union. Generally speaking, in this case Russian-speaking preference can be considered a factor that partially causes a negative effect on geocultural pro-Western and Euro-Atlantic geopolitical orientation of the citizens.

The noted correlations of the aforementioned references are not accidental, for they express socio-structurally caused associations between language, cultural-identification, and geopolitical orientations of the Ukrainian citizens. It's about competition of two alternative value-civilizational gravity vectors of the Ukrainian citizens towards either Europe or Russia. And in this case, Russian language and consonant pro-Russian geopolitical preferences become, in the mass conscience of the Ukrainians, certain symbolic indicators of a civilizational choice of rapprochement with Russia. Thus, citizens who deny the advisability of Russian language having

official status, simultaneously mostly imagine Ukraine as a part of the European community of nations and consider NATO a guarantee of national security. On the other hand, citizens who support an upgrade of the status of Russian language, imagine Ukraine rather as culturally linked to Russia, seeing these two countries as a common civilization. Distancing and emancipation from Russia or from the European Union and NATO are a sociocultural phenomenon which should be associated not only with rational evaluation of geoeconomic and security interests, but also with historical memory, value socialization, in particular educational and media practices, attitude towards one's own national state, and confessional identity.

A support of the idea of Ukraine's foreign policy of neutrality can be viewed as a kind of alternative to Euro-Atlantic geopolitical preferences. In particular, in 2024, when answering a question "How do you feel about the idea of Ukraine not becoming part of any interstate unions or associations?" 53.6% of respondents chose option "Rather negative", 26.6% – "Hard to say", and 19.8% 19.8% – "Rather positive". The share (half) of the Ukrainian citizens who feel negative of its possible neutrality is 20% less than the share (more than two-thirds) of the citizens who feel positive of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. Thus, these 20% of the citizens are characterized by a certain inconsistency, or even ambiguity, of their geopolitical preferences. A two-dimensional distribution of percentages for the indices of attitude towards the idea of Ukraine not joining any interstate unions or associations and attitude towards the idea of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO (Table 4).

Table 4

Association between attitude towards the idea of Ukraine not joining any interstate unions or associations and attitude towards Ukraine joining NATO (2024, %*)

How do you feel about Ukraine joining NATO?	How do you feel about Ukraine not joining any interstate unions or associations?			Total
	Rather positive	Hard to say	Rather negative	
	<i>n</i> = 813	<i>n</i> = 1090	<i>n</i> = 2198	<i>N</i> = 4101
Rather negative	27.8	12.7	7.9	13.1
Hard to say	19.1	35.0	6.6	16.6
Rather positive	53.1	52.3	85.5	70.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Association measures: $\chi^2 = 695.973$; $df = 4$; $p < 0.001$; $\gamma = 0.514$ ($p < 0.001$; asymptotic mean square error = 0.020).

At the same time, among the citizens who feel positive about Ukraine's neutrality, half of them feel positive, while almost one-third feel negative about joining the military block of NATO. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of the citizens who feel negative about Ukraine's neutrality are consistent in their favoring joining NATO. We can compare shares of this and some other categories of the respondents isolated in Table 4, computed against the general national sample ($N = 4101$):

45.8% ($n = 1880$) comprise the respondents with consistent Euro-Atlantic geopolitical preferences: negative feeling about Ukraine's neutrality and positive feeling about its integration into NATO;

13.9% ($n = 570$) – the respondents with rather Euro-Atlantic geopolitical preferences: unsure feeling about Ukraine’s neutrality and positive feeling about its integration into NATO;

10.5% ($n = 432$) – the respondents with inconsistent (ambivalent) geopolitical preferences: positive feeling about Ukraine’s neutrality and positive feeling about its integration into NATO;

9.3% ($n = 382$) – the respondents with unidentified geopolitical preferences: unsure feeling about both Ukraine’s neutrality and its integration into NATO;

5.5% ($n = 226$) – the respondents with consistent geopolitical preferences of neutrality: positive feeling about Ukraine not joining any interstate unions and associations and negative feeling about it becoming a member of NATO.

In general, in 2024 the idea of Ukraine’s foreign policy of neutrality was much less popular among its citizens than the idea of Euro-Atlantic military-political integration which had rather consistent conscious support of approximately half of the citizens. At the same time, many citizens had no established stance on this issue, and their possible self-determination about it in the future could affect the balance of respective alternative views.

We can assume that the idea of Ukraine’s foreign policy of neutrality was already compromised in 2014, when Russia, in spite of its earlier obligations to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, executed a forceful seizure and incorporation of the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In 2022, after Russia declared annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson Oblasts, the state neutrality became unacceptable for the majority of the Ukrainian citizens. Thus, despite neutrality’s general appeal as the idea of peace, the majority of Ukrainian citizens are inclined to prefer the membership in the Euro-Atlantic membership block, which is still much better at guaranteeing protection and support of its member-states and is viewed as more effective means of defence against Russian full-scale aggression.

The attitude of Ukrainian citizens towards the idea of its foreign policy of neutrality is associated with their opinion concerning the need to grant Russian language the official status in Ukrainian society (Table 5).

Table 5

Association between opinion towards the need to grant Russian language status of an official language in Ukraine and attitude towards the idea of Ukraine not joining any interstate unions or associations (2024, %*)

<i>How do you feel about Ukraine not joining any interstate unions or associations?</i>	<i>Do you think the Russian language needs to be granted an official language status in Ukraine?</i>			Total
	Yes	Hard to say	No	
	$n = 311$	$n = 511$	$n = 3279$	$N = 4101$
Rather negative	43.7	23.3	17.0	19.8
Hard to say	25.1	47.4	23.5	26.6
Rather positive	31.2	29.4	59.5	53.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Association measures: $\chi^2 = 307.361$; $df = 4$; $p < 0.001$; $\gamma = 0.430$ ($p < 0.001$; asymptotic mean square error = 0.020).

Citizens for whom the idea of the need to grant Russian language status of an official language in Ukraine is unacceptable, have also a mostly negative attitude towards the idea of Ukraine not joining any interstate unions or associations. On the contrary, among the proponents of the upgrade of the status of Russian language in Ukraine, the share of the proponents of the idea of its foreign policy of neutrality is also greater.

The noted proportions and combinations of language and geopolitical preferences can be explained by their conjugation with the citizens' predominant national and civilizational identity. This conjugation especially increased after outbreaks of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, when a considerable share of the citizens began to view positive or negative attitudes towards the status of Russian language and the neutrality of the Ukrainian state as manifestations of pro-Russian or pro-European civilizational choice, respectively. For the proponents of the pro-European civilizational choice, the country's neutrality is associated with its vulnerability and absence of real guarantees of its security, and rejection of the idea of promotion of the official status of Russian language is commonly caused by understanding that actualization of this issue in Ukraine was an instrument of Russia's political influence, and declaration of "protection of the Russian-speakers" in Ukraine was used as a way to legitimize Russian military aggression. Thus, from this perspective, the major share of the citizens see the acceptance of the neutrality of Ukraine as capitulation to Russia, and rejection of neutrality – as a way of institutional arrangement and fixation of Ukraine's final leaving the Russian sphere of influence and joining the EU and NATO. On the other hand, for the proponents of the upgrade of the status of Russian language, the neutrality of Ukraine makes its final civilizational choice of Europe and unavoidable division and distancing from Russia they feel culturally close to, rather impossible.

In general, it is worth considering all the noted associations of language and geopolitical preferences of the citizens of Ukraine as external symptoms of their causation by some single shared latent socio-cultural factor. Taking these symptoms into account, we can try to model this single latent socio-cultural factor statistically.

Modelling of the latent factor of socio-cultural cleavage of Ukraine

Previously, attempts at statistical modelling of the probable single shared latent factor causing various observed manifestations of socio-cultural cleavages were made based on exploratory factor analysis (Reznik, 2017: pp. 71–72; Reznik, 2019: pp. 151–154). Here such an attempt is made based on a data set from the 2024 monitoring survey by the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine. Factorization encompassed the directly measured indices of language and geopolitical preferences¹. Thus, three

¹ The positions of their scales corresponded to the following score values: a) index «Russian language» measured based on the question “Do you think the Russian language needs to be granted an official language status in Ukraine?” with possible options for the single-choice answer: 1 point – “yes”, 2 points – «hard to say»; 3 points – «no»; b) index “European Union” measured based on the question “How do you feel about Ukraine joining the European Union?” with possible options for the single-choice answer: 1 point – «rather negative», 2 points – «hard to say»; 3 points – «rather positive»;

1-factor models were constructed with Eigenvalues greater than one and a share of explained dispersion greater than 50%. Supposition of existence of a shared latent factor which causes variability of language and geopolitical preferences was generally confirmed. In particular, the first 1-factor model of causality of language, geocultural, and geopolitical preferences was built based on the three directly measured indices (Table 6).

Table 6

Matrix of factor weights for directly measured indices “European Union”, “Russian language”, and “Neutrality” of the 1-factor model (2024, principal component method)

<i>Directly measured indices</i>			<i>Share of explained dispersion, %</i>	<i>Objects of analysis, n</i>
<i>European Union</i>	<i>Russian language</i>	<i>Neutrality</i>		
0.762	0.714	0.681	51.8	4101

The separated factor correlates strongly enough with the three directly measured indices of the monitoring, based on which it was built. But despite this factor being the common one for these three indices in empirical dimension, due to their subjective diversity, it is extremely difficult to interpret it unambiguously in conceptual terms.

In contrast, it is somewhat easier to interpret the second 1-factor model of causality of language, geocultural, and geopolitical preferences, where index “NATO” is used alongside “European Union”, “Russian language”, and “Neutrality” indices (Table 7).

Table 7

Matrix of factor weights for directly measured indices “NATO”, “European Union”, “Russian language”, and “Neutrality” of the 1-factor model (2024, principal component method)

<i>Directly measured indices</i>				<i>Share of explained dispersion, %</i>	<i>Objects of analysis, n</i>
<i>NATO</i>	<i>European Union</i>	<i>Russian language</i>	<i>Neutrality</i>		
0.859	0.821	0.643	0.563	53.6	4101

In this case, correlations of the separated factor with four directly measured indices, based on which it was built, are strong enough, too. Since three of four directly measured indices of this factor is strongly correlated with measured different geopolitical and geocultural orientations, it can be interpreted in theoretical dimension as a general “civilizational orientation” of the respondents. Here and further, attitude

c) index “NATO” measured based on the question “How do you feel about Ukraine joining NATO?” with possible options for the single-choice answer: 1 point – «rather negative», 2 points – «hard to say»; 3 points – «rather positive»; d) index “neutrality” measured based on the question “How do you feel about Ukraine not joining any interstate unions or associations?” with possible options for the single-choice answer: 1 point – «rather negative», 2 points – «hard to say»; 3 points – «rather positive». Factor analysis of correlation matrices of these indices using principal component method performed using the set of sociological data from the 2024 monitoring. Values of the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) sample adequacy criteria confirmed that the factor analysis could have been applied to this sample. Bartlett Test of Sphericity indicated complete suitability of the respective data for the factor analysis.

towards “Ukraine joining the European Union” is viewed as geocultural orientation of the citizens towards integration of their country into this economic and political interstate body, and their attitude towards “Ukraine joining NATO” – as geopolitical orientation towards integration of their country into this military-political interstate block.

Eventually, it is even easier to interpret the third 1-factor model of causality of strictly geopolitical preferences directly measured by all three of the indices used in it (Table 8).

Table 8

Matrix of factor weights for directly measured indices “NATO”, “European Union”, and “Neutrality” of the 1-factor model (2024, principal component method)

<i>Directly measured indices</i>			<i>Share of explained dispersion, %</i>	<i>Objects of analysis, n</i>
<i>NATO</i>	<i>European Union</i>	<i>Neutrality</i>		
0.875	0.866	0.594	62.3	4101

Two of three indices which this factor is built upon, directly show measures of geopolitical orientations of the respondents – their attitudes towards Ukraine joining NATO and towards the idea of its neutrality. Thus, this modelled factor should be interpreted as “geopolitical orientation” of the respondents, which, in turn, causes their respective concrete geopolitical preferences. Under the conditions of a full-scale war against Russia, the greatest value being that of factor weight of the “NATO” index is symptomatic as an expression of the greatest importance for the citizens of Ukraine of solving the issue of national security of their country by integration into the Euro-Atlantic security organization.

Predominantly Euro-Atlantic vector of geopolitical orientation of the Ukrainians in 2024, as well as their view of NATO integration as key for the national security of Ukraine, are caused by the formation since the beginning of the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of a deep sense of existential Russian threat, feeling of high uncertainty and danger concerning the future of national independence and territorial integrity. Under these circumstances, the Ukrainians started to view NATO as the most reliable mechanism of collective defence, the best way to assure reliable guarantees of their national security, deterrence of further Russian aggression, and survival of their national state.

Probably, what is making itself felt here is an extremely negative historical experience of Ukrainian society and realization that strictly declarative international guarantees of security of Ukraine that did not stop Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022, are not enough. Instead, NATO membership, based on its formal statutory Article 5, according to which an attack against one member-state of NATO is considered an attack against all member-states of NATO, seems now to the vast majority of the Ukrainian citizens as a real guarantee of their national security. That is, the shared system of NATO collective defence is seen as a factor of making new Russian acts of aggression against Ukraine impossible. It cannot be ruled out, after all, that the Ukrainian citizens do not only think of the Euro-Atlantic security organization as only a possible deterrent of Russian aggression, but also see it as a possible way towards

establishing civilizational values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and economic freedoms as a way to separate from the Russian authoritarian influence completely and facilitate their European identity. That is, the Euro-Atlantic institutions presently seem to match the respective value expectations of the majority of the Ukrainian citizens concerning democracy and the defence of their sovereignty.

Since the factors of geopolitical and general civilizational orientation divide the citizens of Ukraine according to their sociocultural preferences, it makes sense to model this division of the Ukrainian society statistically.

Model of sociocultural cleavage of the present-day Ukrainian society

It is possible to have classification of the citizens by their sociocultural orientation based on modelling their cumulative self-determination using scales of directly measured indices of language and geopolitical/geocultural preferences. Attempts at building similar classification using rapid cluster analysis (k-means method) were made earlier (Reznik, 2017: pp. 73–75; Reznik, 2019: pp. 154–160). This time clusterization is made based on the data of the 2024 monitoring survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine in continuum of scales of directly measured indices of language and geopolitical, civilizational preferences: “Russian language”, “European Union”, “NATO”, and “neutrality”. The scale positions of these indices matched the same values in points as those used in their factorization procedure (see above). This way, the classification in the form of 2-cluster solution was obtained (Table 9).

Table 9

Cluster analysis results: cluster fullness, classified and non-classified objects (respondents) (2024, *n*)

<i>Fullness</i>		<i>Classified objects</i>	<i>Objects out of the classification scope</i>
<i>Cluster 1</i>	<i>Cluster 2</i>		
3108	993	4101	0

It is possible to interpret the obtained 2-cluster variable based on comparison of final centers of the clusters – mean values (points) of directly measured original indices of clusterization for each cluster (Table 10).

Table 10

Final centers of the clusters (2024, *M*^{*})

<i>Original (directly measured) index</i>	<i>Clusters</i>	
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
Russian language	2.86	2.29
European Union	3	2
NATO	3	2
Neutrality	2.51	1.80

* Range of scales of original indices: 1–3 points.

Both separated clusters are internally homogenous enough and notably different from one another.

In particular, the respondents from cluster 1 mostly disagree with the need to increase the status of the “Russian language” in Ukraine, feel mostly positive about Ukraine becoming a member of the “European Union” and “NATO”, and mostly negative about the idea of its “Neutrality”. Here the predominant answers to the two questions out of four can be interpreted as pro-Western civilizational preferences towards “European Union” and “NATO”. On the other hand, the predominant answers to another two questions out of four can also be interpreted as geopolitical preferences towards “NATO” and prejudices against the idea of “Neutrality”. Thus, it is more appropriate to define the predominant social orientation of the respondents in this cluster as Euro-Atlantic.

At the same time, the respondents in cluster 2 mostly disagree with the need to increase the status of the “Russian language” in Ukraine, generally show undecided attitude towards Ukraine becoming a member of the “European Union” and “NATO”, and also feel mostly positive about the idea of its “Neutrality”. Thus, the social orientation of the respondents from cluster 2 is rather difficult to interpret and identify unambiguously in conceptual terms: in geopolitical dimension, its orientation is rather uncertain and/or neutral.

The obtained 2-cluster variable separates two social categories with different geopolitical and other sociocultural preferences – 75.8% Euro-Atlantic-oriented and 24.2% uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine. Homogeneity measures of these two clusters differ noticeably (Table 11).

Table 11

Dynamic of mean distances from the center for the two clusters (2024, M)

<i>Euro-Atlantic-oriented</i>			<i>Uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented</i>			<i>Dispersion analysis indices</i>	
<i>M</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
0.83	3108	0.47	1.35	993	0.41	984.309	0.000

Here we are talking about mean values of the index which measures distance of each respondent from the center of ‘their’ cluster. In this case, the ‘distance’ between the respondent and the ‘cluster center’ is a ‘deviation’ of this respondent’s measures of language, geocultural, and geopolitical preferences from the most typical measures of the preferences in question within this cluster as a whole. The lower these deviations (M values) within a cluster are, the more homogeneous it is, and vice versa – the higher these deviations (M values) within a cluster are, the lower its homogeneity relatively to the primary indices used for the clusterization will be.

The cluster of respondents with Euro-Atlantic orientations is more homogeneous by language, geocultural, and geopolitical preferences. The greater homogeneity of this social category of the citizens might be a precondition of them having a more unanimous aspiration for realization of the idea of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, and also of generating feelings of national solidarity and unity in respectful collective actions. At the same time, the lower homogeneity of the cluster of the

respondents whose geopolitical orientations are undefined or neutral at the moment, can be viewed as an unlikely precondition of the future eagerness of this social category of the citizens to legitimize the Euro-Atlantic prospect of Ukraine and solidarize with its proponents.

The 2024 division of civil society of Ukraine into two social categories – dominating majority of Euro-Atlantic-oriented (75.8%) and minority of those with undefined/neutral attitudes (24.2%) is a result of structural differentiation of Ukrainian society caused by the war. A significant share of the Ukrainian citizens favoring Russia remained on the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russian troops. At the same time, the war against Ukraine started by the Russian Federation in 2014 cemented the image of Russia as an existential threat for the majority of the Ukrainians and swayed them towards belief in Euro-Atlantic integration as a guarantee of survival of the national statehood. The idea of geocultural and geopolitical multi-vectorness, neutrality, balancing between Western countries and Russia which was popular in Ukraine before 2014, was compromised in mass consciousness after Russia's annexation of Ukrainian Crimea and totally destroyed in public discourse after 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. But the fact that a significant share of Ukrainian civil society remains in a state of declared geopolitical uncertainty or even obvious adherence to the foreign policy of neutrality of their country as a victim of military aggression, hides major sociocultural risks of national destabilization during the war.

In general, the separated latent sociocultural factor can be formally viewed as one of the deepest structures of mass political conscience of the present-day Ukraine, namely as a factor of civilization-geopolitical orientation of its citizens or as a vector of their pro-European/post-Soviet and pro-Russian identity. We are talking about a peculiar generalized axis of the worldview division of Ukrainian citizens which also structures their language, geopolitical, and civilizational preferences, urges them to make a worldview choice of Ukraine's sociocultural affiliation to the community of European/Eurasian countries. This factor has a bipolar structure of the respondents' self-determination between these two poles. One of the poles is support of Ukraine joining NATO (geopolitical affiliation) and the European Union (civilization standard), denial of the need to increase the status of Russian language (cultural Russian Imperial/post-Soviet continuity), and negative attitude towards neutrality (strategic uncertainty) of sovereign post-colonial Ukraine. The other pole is distancing from NATO and the European Union, support of Russian language and of neutrality of post-Imperial and post-Soviet Ukraine as culturally linked with Russia. Under the conditions of war against Russia, the support by the share of the citizens of Ukraine's neutrality can mask their unwillingness to sever all ties with the aggressor.

Sociocultural risks of national destabilization during the war

Citizens belonging to various communities with different sociocultural orientations could lead to different perceptions of social circumstances, processes, and phenomena. Sometimes such a difference leads to civil conflicts which become a challenge to the national stability of the society. In particular, while analyzing the main threats for the national stability of Ukraine during the war time, we should note different extents of

psychological reactions of the Euro-Atlantic and of the uncertainly/neutrally oriented groups of the citizens to the current state of Ukrainian society's fight against the Russian aggressor. Most of all, it is related to the respondents' evaluations of psychological endurance of the majority of people from their environment (Table 12).

Table 12

Measure of psychological endurance of the people in the environment of the Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine under the war conditions (2024, %*)

<i>Because of the war, people face many problems (food and goods prices increase, electricity and warm supply becomes problematic, number of workplaces shrinks). What do you think, the majority of people from your environment are...</i>	<i>Euro-Atlantic-oriented</i>	<i>Uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented</i>	<i>Sample overall</i>
	<i>n = 3108</i>	<i>n = 993</i>	<i>N = 4101</i>
Willing to endure the present and the future problems as much as needed until Ukraine's victory in the war	48.6	25.2	42.9
Willing to endure the present and the future problems but for a limited time only	26.9	23.6	26.1
Unwilling to endure the problems already	10.1	26.7	14.1
Hard to say	14.4	24.6	16.8
Overall	100	100	100

*Association measures: $\chi^2 = 293.352$; $df = 3$; $p < 0.001$; Cramér's $V = 0.267$ ($p < 0.001$).

Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens note much higher inclination towards psychological endurance in the face of everyday hardships under the war conditions in their environment than uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented citizens note in theirs.

We can assume that the differences in subjective perception of psychological endurance of one's social environment between Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens in 2024 are caused by different perception and comprehension of the events of the ongoing war, the accompanying sufferings and everyday hardships. In particular, Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens can view the war against the Russian aggressor not only as existential threat, unbelievable hardships, and unavoidable sacrifices, but as, first of all, fight for their country's future, freedom, and European civilization choice. From this perspective, psychological endurance, adaptability, and fortitude in unequal but productive fight against Russian invaders seem expected and meaningful, phenomenal moral virtues. On the other hand, geopolitically uncertainly or neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine see the war most probably as rather chaotic, natural, and accidental disaster which causes harm, leads to instability, deprives them of life perspective. From this perspective, all accompanying hardships are associated with senseless losses, endurance in resisting them – with pointless exhaustion, and demonstrated adaptability to unfavorable circumstances – with necessity. Thus, such a pessimism most often leads to concentrating mostly on feelings of tiredness, apathy, and anxiety observed in one's environment.

We can assume that social meso- and microenvironments which citizens of Ukraine gravitate to and predominantly involuntarily stay in, can also influence their perceptions

of levels of psychological endurance in their environment under the war conditions. That is, the citizens are mostly inclined to communicate with those having similar values, perception and interpretation of events, information sources etc. Thus, the Euro-Atlantic meso- and microenvironment with its collective practices of volunteering, donating, mutual aid, and support can generate and increase general attitudes of psychological endurance under the conditions of existential war. In contrast, in social meso- and microenvironments of the citizens with uncertain/neutral geopolitical preferences, where people mostly tend to avoid public discussions of the war against Russian invaders and concentrate on private issues of survival instead, there will most probably be also a lack of articulation and accentuation of psychological endurance of civil society as part of resistance against aggressive Russia.

Eventually, we should note a greater cognitive outline, clearness, and certain unambiguity of Euro-Atlantic preferences, in particular as a desired foreign policy goal of the country, expressiveness of faith in support of the Western allies and positive expectations, while it is doubtful that geopolitically uncertain/neutral preferences have a clear vision of any scenarios of the country's acceptable and distinct future, being rather conjugated with the feelings of general tiredness, exhaustion, and depression.

It is possible that these different evaluations of the psychological endurance degree reflect real differences between these two social categories of citizens by this parameter. And based on these differences between citizens in psychological endurance in situations of everyday hardships under the war conditions, other differences may appear in disposition towards their country's victory in the war against the aggressor, and hence the lack of mutual understanding and unity between them.

In particular, there exist distinct differences in the measure of assuredness of Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens in Ukraine's victory in the war against Russia (Table 13).

Table 13

Measure of assuredness of Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens in Ukraine's victory in the war against Russia (2024, %*)

<i>How much are you assured in Ukraine's victory in the war against Russia?</i>	<i>Euro-Atlantic-oriented</i>	<i>Uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented</i>	<i>Sample overall</i>
	<i>n = 3108</i>	<i>n = 993</i>	<i>N = 4101</i>
Completely assured	40.2	20.2	35.3
Rather assured	34.7	19.8	31.1
Rather not assured	8.4	14.6	9.9
Completely not assured	3.1	12.6	5.4
Hard to say	13.7	32.7	18.3
Overall	100	100	100

*Association measures: $\chi^2 = 441.927$; $df = 4$; $p < 0.001$; Cramér's $V = 0.328$ ($p < 0.001$).

Euro-Atlantic orientation is much stronger conjugated with assuredness in the victory of one's country over the aggressor than uncertain geopolitical-geocultural

orientation or orientation on one's country neutrality. Here we can see fundamentally different approaches to the interpretation of the current war as ways to ascribe certain senses to its events, course, and expected outcome. Euro-Atlantic orientation in general assumes such a vision of the desired victory in liberation war against Russian invaders which views Ukraine as a part of a community of European countries, historically more successful and stronger as a whole than Russia. And this collective thought feeds on expectations for economic, military, and technological support of the Western allies, and hence is capable of generating the assuredness in Ukraine's victory. On the other hand, geopolitically neutral or uncertain orientation is rather associated with ideas of Ukraine's neutrality or civilizational looseness of identity, and thus assumes viewing it as not belonging to Eurasian nor European community of countries. Such imaginary geopolitical "detachedness" of Ukraine can be associated with thoughts of great riskiness and unpredictability of its liberation war against the Russian aggressor, or even of it being doomed to lose the fight against this much stronger opponent. In other words, preferences of geopolitical neutrality or uncertainty of geopolitical preferences are rather associated with pessimism, negative fatalism, and disbelief in Ukraine's victory in the war against Russia. A different measure of assuredness in the victory of one's own country over the aggressor can stimulate fundamentally different behavior of these two categories of citizens under common existential circumstances, cause enmity between them and, in the end, undermine the national stability of Ukrainian society.

Another difference between Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine under the war conditions reveals itself in their evaluations of effectiveness of the Ukrainian state opposing the aggressor (Table 14).

Table 14

Evaluations of effectiveness of the Ukrainian state by Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine under the war conditions (2024, %*)

<i>How much are you assured in Ukraine's victory in the war against Russia?</i>	<i>Euro-Atlantic-oriented</i>	<i>Uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented</i>	<i>Sample overall</i>
	<i>n = 3108</i>	<i>n = 993</i>	<i>N = 4101</i>
Central authorities barely cope with their duties	28.7	45.8	32.9
Central authorities partially cope with their duties	47.5	28.2	42.8
Central authorities cope with almost all their duties	9.0	4.1	7.8
Hard to say	14.8	21.9	16.5
Overall	100	100	100

* Association measures: $\chi^2 = 177.196$; $df = 3$; $p < 0.001$; Cramér's $V = 0.208$ ($p < 0.001$).

More than half of Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens consider their state at least partially effective in fulfilling its functions, while among those uncertainly and/or neutral oriented citizens, only one third of them are inclined to such generally positive evaluations. We can assume that Euro-Atlantic and geopolitically neutral/uncertain

orientations of the citizens are associated with accompanying different visions and evaluations of one's national country. In particular, for the Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens in 2024, the Ukrainian state seemed a rather generally satisfactory military-diplomatic tool for the survival of the nation under the conditions of existential war. Despite corruption, disadvantages, and governance mistakes, for these citizens their national state looked rather relatively successful because its institutions functioned satisfactorily in the emergency, the army proved and kept its capability to defend the country, the government received Western aid and avoided the economic collapse, and the society obviously did not break apart. Thus, from this perspective, the state is surviving, fighting, and fulfilling Euro-Atlantic preferences of these very citizens, and its criticism, even fully grounded, seems not quite appropriate under the extreme conditions of war. In contrast, citizens inclined to support geopolitical neutrality or having geopolitically uncertain preferences, are inclined to evaluate the state first and foremost by its service capabilities in maintaining social order, justice, and well-being. From this probable perspective, the state seems rather excessively cruel and unjust because of completely natural restrictions of rights and freedoms under the wartime conditions, the ongoing mobilization of those liable for military service into the army and still persisting corruption, social inequality, bureaucracy red tape etc. The differences between the noted evaluation opinions of the citizens concerning their national state can hinder their solidarity in supporting it under the conditions of liberation war against the invaders: those who consider the state ineffective can start demanding immediate changes of its leadership during the wartime, and those who consider it effective will demonstrate loyalty to its leaders. Such political differentiation between the citizens also conceals major risks of the national instability of the society.

Eventually, forecast evaluations of the future of Ukraine from Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/ neutrally oriented citizens under the war conditions also differ partially (Table 15).

Table 15

Forecast evaluations of the future of Ukraine from Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/ neutrally oriented citizens under the war conditions (2024, %*)

What do you think of the future of Ukraine?	<i>Euro-Atlantic-oriented</i>	<i>Uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented</i>	<i>Sample overall</i>
	<i>n = 3108</i>	<i>n = 993</i>	<i>N = 4101</i>
Most probably the situation will get worse	26.8	47.2	31.7
The situation will not get worse, but will doubtfully get better also	26.3	18.4	24.4
Most probably, the situation will get better	27.8	12.3	24.1
Hard to say	19.0	22.1	19.8
Overall	100	100	100

*Association measures: $\chi^2 = 197.124$; $df = 3$; $p < 0.001$; Cramér's $V = 0.219$ ($p < 0.001$).

More than a quarter of Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens are inclined towards positive forecasts concerning the future of Ukraine, while almost half of uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented citizens — towards negative ones. The noted differences in the forecasts concerning the future of Ukraine can be associated with different geopolitical identities of these two social categories of the citizens. The citizens with Euro-Atlantic geopolitical identity have advantage of higher cognitive expressiveness of their expectations of the victory in the war, integration of their country into Europe and its modernization. It is possible they are also taking into account the fact that the countries of North America and Western Europe won the so-called 'Cold War' against the USSR and its satellites not so long ago in a peaceful civilizational competition. Thus, the understanding that Ukraine is striving to integrate into the historically and civilizationally successful and victorious community of the European countries, hopes to allocate various resources of these countries to achieve successful institutional modernization of their country allow for more positive forecasts concerning the future of Ukraine. That is, Euro-Atlantic orientation of the citizens is more conjugated with their historical optimism, because in the past European democracies won, and Eurasian autocracies lost in the previous lengthy historical and civilizational struggle. On the other hand, the citizens with uncertain or neutral geopolitical identity lack such a vivid idea of Ukraine's external-integration goals; such goals are either not envisioned, or consciously restricted by the preferred neutrality, that is a certain isolation of their country on the international stage. Hence, the lack of distinct geopolitical reference points can predispose towards negative forecasts concerning the future of Ukraine. This difference in envisioning one's country's future (predominance of optimism or pessimism in attitudes) also cannot be considered favourable for bringing the citizens together, and thus for the national stability of the society at war with the external enemy.

Another potential source of great danger for the national stability of Ukraine are significant differences between citizens' perception of the very idea of the unity of the Ukrainian nation, and the degree of their faith in this unity (Table 16).

Table 16

Degree of faith in the unity of the Ukrainian nation of Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/ neutrally oriented citizens (2024, %*)

<i>What do you think of the future of Ukraine?</i>	<i>Euro-Atlantic-oriented</i>	<i>Uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented</i>	<i>Sample overall</i>
	<i>n = 3108</i>	<i>n = 993</i>	<i>N = 4101</i>
Fully disagree	4.3	11.9	6.1
Partially disagree	13.4	18.6	14.7
Partially agree	34.5	28.7	33.1
Fully agree	43.1	28.6	39.6
Hard to say	4.8	12.2	6.6
Overall	100	100	100

*Association measures: $\chi^2 = 195.681$; $df = 4$; $p < 0.001$; Cramér's $V = 0.218$ ($p < 0.001$).

The majority, that is, 3/4 of Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens generally believe in the future unity of the Ukrainian nation despite all the conflicts and historical differences between its various stratas. In contrast, the share of those who have the same beliefs in the future unity of the nation among the uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented citizens reaches just a little more than a half, and the share of those who do not believe in this future unity comprises nearly one third of the overall size of this social category. We can assume that Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens are inclined to view the ongoing war against the Russian aggressor as an existential challenge which contributes to the national cohesion of Ukraine despite its sociocultural variety. After all, not only shared war challenges but also distinct Euro-Atlantic orientation incline towards shared vision of the desired future which is rather seen in integration into the European Union and NATO, establishment of democracy, building of modern national state etc. In contrast, uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented citizens most probably view the ongoing war against Russia as a source of new social traumas, injustices, civil conflicts, and cleavages, in particular as a result of a very ambiguous perception of Russian language, culture, and church in Ukraine. Even such a partial spread of disbelief in national unity among the citizens can hamper their search for mutual understanding and solidarization under the war conditions, thus interfering with the national establishment of Ukrainian society.

At the same time, percentage distributions of the respondents' choices of a certain socio-civil self-identity might be a sign of a certain potential of possible national destabilization (Table 17).

Table 17

Socio-civil self-identification of Euro-Atlantic-oriented and uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine (2024, %*)

<i>Whom do you consider yourself in the first place?</i>	<i>Euro-Atlantic-oriented</i>	<i>Uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented</i>	<i>Sample overall</i>
	<i>n = 3108</i>	<i>n = 993</i>	<i>N = 4101</i>
Dweller of a village, district, or a town in which you live	6.5	14.0	8.3
Dweller of a region (oblast or several oblasts) in which you live	1.9	5.2	2.7
Citizen of Ukraine	80.3	59.1	75.2
Representative of your ethnos, nation	3.8	3.4	3.7
Citizen of the former USSR	0.2	4.8	1.3
Citizen of Europe	1.9	0.8	1.6
Citizen of the world	4.0	8.7	5.1
Other	1.3	3.9	2.0
Overall	100	100	100

*Association measures: $\chi^2 = 310.306$; $df = 7$; $p < 0.001$; Cramér's $V = 0.275$ ($p < 0.001$).

The absolute majority of Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens preferred their own civil national identity. At the same time, the value of the similar index among uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens is 20% less, while the total share of various local, relict, or cosmopolitical social identities they preferred comprises almost 40%. Despite relatively small separate percentages of their preferences, total preferences of these eclectic identities show a generally significant quantitative alternative to the civil national identity. And this can be a certain symptom of possible political opposition to national statehood which can reveal itself more distinctly with time.

It is possible that, from the perspective of the citizens with Euro-Atlantic geopolitical orientation, it was under the conditions of the war against the Russian invaders that national-civil identity revealed its advantages and potential, when the political solidarity of the military and the civilians, Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers, different historical regions etc., expressed itself 'not in word, but indeed'. As of 2024, the Ukrainian civil nation revealed both its unyielding strength and subjectiveness in a cruel existential fight for its own place in the world, and strengthening of the feeling of national pride, moral righteousness, and historical meaningfulness of the Ukrainians. Instead, neutral/uncertain geopolitical identity enables a certain psychological distancing from the existential war against Russia and Ukrainian national state and civil nation, even though they passed through quite a hardening in this yet unfinished war and confirmed the undeniable reality of their existence.

The differences in percentage distribution along the index of the desired television language between sub-samples of Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine can be interpreted in a similar fashion (Table 18).

Table 18

Desired television language for Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine (2024, %*)

What language would you like to watch (listen to) the television programmes that are of interest to you in?	<i>Euro-Atlantic-oriented</i>	<i>Uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented</i>	<i>Sample overall</i>
	<i>n = 3108</i>	<i>n = 993</i>	<i>N = 4101</i>
Ukrainian only	75.2	41.3	67.0
Russian only	0.3	2.9	0.9
Both Ukrainian and Russian in equal measure	7.8	24.6	11.8
No matter whether Ukrainian or Russian	15.1	27.6	18.1
Other language	1.0	1.0	1.0
Hard to say	0.7	2.6	1.2
Overall	100	100	100

* Association measures: $\chi^2 = 455.238$; $df = 5$; $p < 0.001$; Cramér's $V = 0.333$ ($p < 0.001$).

The presented distribution does not suggest the explicit, and openly impudent during the liberation war against Russia, choice of strictly Russian language for personal television watching. But uncertainly/neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine are less (by 30%) inclined to choose strictly Ukrainian language, preferring instead to

much greater extent the options of equal usage of Ukrainian and Russian languages or any of them on the television.

As of 2024, for the Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens, Ukrainian language became the language of the sovereign state with unquestionable international subjectiveness, the language of the state which endured in an unequal fight and is still putting up a fierce and productive resistance against one of the most powerful and aggressive states in the world. From this perspective, strictly Ukrainian language of the television, and Ukrainian monolingualism in general, can be seen as an attribute of national sovereignty, while hegemony of Ukrainian language in society can be seen as a border of sorts against Russia, symbol of final separation from the aggressor, symbolic marker of independent Euro-Atlantic civilizational choice. On the other hand, the citizens with neutral or uncertain geopolitical preferences, for whom Russian language mostly remains the language of their privacy, childhood, family, cultural practices, and media habits, inevitably experience psychological frustration and moral losses under the conditions of war against Russian invaders. Under these circumstances, for these citizens Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism and Russian-speaking can be a way to keep their private space intact and distance themselves from the war. Instead, the policy of de-Russification, decolonization, and Ukrainization, resolutely pursued by the Ukrainian state under the conditions of liberation war against Russian aggressor, can be seen by these citizens as one of the forms of the harsh state oppression. Hence, different geopolitical identities of the citizens are rather tightly conjugated with their different language preferences.

All in all, rather significant differences of percentages among options of language choice for private viewing of TV programmes between subsamples of Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/ neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine articulate sociocultural potential of a possible political conflict between them on the grounds of policy of usage of different language in Ukraine's information space, and such a conflict can pose a threat of national destabilization of the Ukrainian society.

Differences of percentage distributions along the index of Orthodox-church self-identification of the Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/ neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine show no less sociocultural potential of the national destabilization in Ukraine (Table 19).

Table 19

Orthodox-church self-identification of the Euro-Atlantic and uncertainly/ neutrally oriented citizens of Ukraine (2024, %*)

<i>What Orthodox church do you consider yourself belonging to?</i>	<i>Euro-Atlantic-oriented</i>	<i>Uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented</i>	<i>Sample overall</i>
	<i>n = 2125</i>	<i>n = 709</i>	<i>N = 2834</i>
To the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (Metropolitan Epiphanius)	47.4	21.4	40.9
To the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Onufriy), but do not consider myself belonging to Moscow Patriarchate	5.6	10.9	7.0
To the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Onufriy) and consider myself belonging to Moscow Patriarchate	0.3	3.9	1.2

What Orthodox church do you consider yourself belonging to?	<i>Euro-Atlantic-oriented</i>	<i>Uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented</i>	<i>Sample overall</i>
	<i>n = 2125</i>	<i>n = 709</i>	<i>N = 2834</i>
To another Orthodox church	1.5	2.4	1.7
Visit church temples, but do not know which Church they belong, exactly	3.5	5.1	3.9
Just an Orthodox Christian, do not belong to any of the Churches	33.4	39.1	34.8
Hard to say	8.3	17.2	10.5
Overall	100	100	100

*Association measures: $\chi^2 = 216.464$; $df = 6$; $p < 0.001$; Cramér's $V = 0.276$ ($p < 0.001$).

It turned out that among uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented citizens there were 26% less of those belonging to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (Metropolitan Epiphanius), 8.9% in total more of those belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Onufriy), 5.7% more of 'just Orthodox Christians' and those belonging to none of the Churches, and 8.9% more of those unable to decide on the answer. In spite of dispersion of these differences in percentages among various positions of the index scale of the Orthodox-church self-identification, in total they show the signs of a confessional cleavage in the modern Ukrainian Orthodoxy, which can become a major threat to the national stability of the society. This threat can come true under the conditions of destructive manipulations and external stimulation of a potential religious conflict between the Orthodox confessions in Ukraine.

It should be noted that the most numerous Orthodox Christian religious community of Ukraine had been since 1990 and still is divided into confessions, oriented either on maintenance and preservation of spiritual connection with the Russian Orthodox Church (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate), or independence (autocephaly) from it (Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (1992–2018), Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (1994–2018), Orthodox Church of Ukraine since 2019). And for more than three decades, the most heated conflict had been going on between these very confessional poles of Ukrainian Orthodox Christianity. At the height of the full-scale war against Russia, the potential of this conflict increased: under the war conditions. Orthodox Christian confessional affiliation stopped being viewed as a question of solely personal faith, for a share of patriotically spirited citizens started to view it as a sign of loyalty/opposition to one's national state.

Collectively, language, confessional and other manifestations of sociocultural differentiation of the society can have an impact on (de)legitimation of the national statehood. That is, the inclination of the citizens of Ukraine to recognize their national statehood as more or less meaningful for them is associated with the aforementioned sociocultural factors of their language preferences/prejudices, geocultural/geopolitical orientations, and also confessional self-identification. Measuring and comparison of the associations of these factors with the citizens' inclinations to legitimate their

statehood in 2024 can be done using multiple linear regression model¹. Values for R-squared and adjusted R-squared parameters demonstrate generally rather low prognosticity of the constructed model (Table 20).

Table 20

**Coefficients of the multiple linear regression equation for the dependent variable
“Citizens’ personal meaningfulness of their statehood” (2024, N = 4100*)**

<i>Independent variables</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>β</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Constant term	6.605	0.158	–	41.780	0.000
Preference of strictly Ukrainian-language television space	0.455	0.060	0.130	7.629	0.000
Unacceptability of increasing the status of Russian language	0.565	0.049	0.203	11.641	0.000
Self-identification with Greek-Catholicism	0.216	0.101	0.031	2.127	0.034
Self-identification with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine	0.152	0.055	0.041	2.764	0.006

¹ **Dependent variable** in the regression equation is the citizens’ personal meaningfulness of their statehood, measured based on responses to the question “How important for you personally is the existence of the independent Ukrainian state? Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 – not important at all, 10 – very important”.

Independent variables in the regression equation are:

1) *language preferences/prejudices*:

- a) preference of strictly Ukrainian-language television space – dummy dichotomous variable which assumes value 1 for those who, while answering the question “What language would you like to watch (listen to) the television programmes that are of interest to you in?”, chose single answer “Ukrainian only”, and value 0 for the rest of the respondents;
- b) unacceptability of increasing the status of Russian language, measured based on responses to the question “Do you think Russian language needs to be granted an official language status in Ukraine?” with possible answer options “1 – yes, 2 – hard to say, 3 – no”;

2) *confessional self-identifications*:

- a) self-identification with Greek-Catholicism – dummy dichotomous variable which assumes value 1 for those who, while answering the question “What confession do you consider yourself belonging to?”, chose single answer “Greek-Catholicism”, and value 0 for the rest of the respondents;
- b) self-identification with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine – dummy dichotomous variable which assumes value 1 for those who, while answering the question “What Orthodox church do you consider yourself belonging to?”, chose single answer “To the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (Metropolitan Epiphanius)”, and value 0 for the rest of the respondents in the sample;

3) *geocultural/geopolitical orientations*:

- a) pro-European geocultural orientation, measured based on responses to the question “How do you feel about Ukraine joining the European Union?” with possible answer options “1 – rather negative, 2 – hard to say, 3 – rather positive”;
- b) Euro-Atlantic geopolitical orientation, measured based on responses to the question “How do you feel about Ukraine joining NATO?” with possible answer options “1 – rather negative, 2 – hard to say, 3 – rather positive”;
- c) geocultural/geopolitical orientation towards the neutrality of Ukraine, measured based on responses to the question “How do you feel about Ukraine not joining any interstate unions or associations?” with possible answer options “1 – rather negative, 2 – hard to say, 3 – rather positive”.

<i>Independent variables</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>β</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Pro-European geocultural orientation	0.125	0.045	0.053	2.763	0.006
Euro-Atlantic geopolitical orientation	0.291	0.046	0.126	6.274	0.000
Geocultural/geopolitical orientation towards the neutrality of Ukraine	-0.094	0.032	-0.045	-2.960	0.003

* *R-squared* = 0.181; *Adjusted R-squared* = 0.179; *F* = 128.808; *F Sig.* = 0.000.

Nevertheless, this model is partially informative, for it revealed statistically significant (*Sig.* values) positive or negative (“-” sign) associations of all the separated sociocultural factors with citizens’ personal meaningfulness of their statehood. And the strength of these associations can be compared (based on the values of standardized regression coefficients β).

Language preferences/prejudices have the tightest coupling with the respondents’ inclination to legitimate their statehood. The strongest here is the association between the prejudice against possible upgrade of the status of Russian language with the measure of personal meaningfulness of the national statehood: the respondents who predominantly deny the need for such a status promotion (80%), declare the highest measures of the importance of existence of independent Ukrainian state for them personally. The association between preference of strictly Ukrainian-language television space and support of national statehood turned out slightly weaker (67% of respondents). The statehood is less meaningful for the totality of the respondents for whom it does not matter whether Ukrainian or Russian language is used for the TV programmes (18.1%), those who are willing to watch or listen to the TV programmes in Ukrainian and Russian in equal measure (11.8%) and the others.

Among the geocultural/geopolitical orientations, the predominant Euro-Atlantic geopolitical orientation towards Ukraine joining NATO (found in 70.3% of the respondents) is most closely associated with inclination towards highest measures of legitimation of the national statehood. At the same time, the association between the measure of personal meaningfulness of the national statehood and the geocultural orientation towards Ukraine becoming a member of the European Union (73.3% of the respondent) and minority geocultural/geopolitical orientation towards Ukraine’s neutrality (19.8%) turned out to be twice as weak. Taking advantage of the opportunity, it is worth reminding that in 2024 the idea of Ukraine’s neutrality was met rather ambiguously: the distinctly measured half of the respondents were negatively inclined towards it, while a quarter of the respondents were undecided about their feelings towards it.

Statistically meaningful associations between the recognition of personal meaningfulness of the national statehood with separate confessional self-identifications turned out weaker compared with the associations between this recognition and language preferences/prejudices and geocultural/geopolitical orientations. Hence, we can assume that in 2024 the dominating majority of the respondents felt negatively towards possible status promotion of Russian language in Ukrainian society, seeing it

as a threat to the national statehood institution. It is possible that such a heightened feeling formed as a result of numerous ultimate demands of the aggressor country Russia's leaders and spokesperson concerning immediate necessity of status promotion of Russian language in Ukraine, which, expectedly, could lead to a conflict within it, undermine its civil solidarity and national resilience. Instead, in 2024 the prevailing positive Euro-Atlantic geopolitical orientation towards integration of Ukraine into the NATO security institutions could have been seen by the measured majority of the respondents as a way to neutralize existential military threats from the aggressive neighbouring states. All in all, statistical meaningfulness of the revealed associations between language, geopolitical/geocultural, and, to a lesser extent, confessional differentiation of Ukraine and different perceptions of its statehood, articulates the risks of internal sociocultural conflict as a threat to the national stability of Ukrainian society. There is a dangerous conjugation, association, or combination of several lines of sociocultural cleavages of the civil community of Ukraine based on the language, geopolitical, geocultural, confessional and various socio-psychological features. This fact calls for further observations, measurements, analysis, and scientific expertise.

Findings discussion

In due time, Heraclitus defined a social-structuring function of a war between the people: "War is Mother of all, and Queen of all. She renders some gods, other men; she makes some slaves, others free" (Heraclitus, 1991: p. 155). The general meaning was that a war unavoidably ruins the pre-war social order of societies, international relations, humanity as a whole, and creates a new one.

The Russo-Ukrainian war which has been lasting for more than 10 years already (since 2014), thoroughly restructured the present-day Ukrainian society. As a result of military actions, losses, and occupation, there were certain changes in territorial, demographic, settlement, language, confessional, ethnic, symbolic, and general sociocultural dimensions of the structure of present-day Ukrainian society. Russian aggressors occupied vast territories in the east and south of Ukraine, taking a significant share of Ukrainian population of these lands under their control, who were mostly Russian-speaking and (at least, before the war) favoring Russia and its culture. As a result, the ethnic, language, sociocultural, and political heterogeneity of Ukrainian society decreased somewhat. It means that the ongoing war also unavoidably restructured geopolitical orientation of the Ukrainian citizens as a system of their ideas, identities, values, and expectations, which determines what civilization space they consider their country belonging to. In turn, geopolitical orientation as a form of mass civilization identification structures geopolitical sociocultural and moral choices of the citizens, determines what historical, cultural, and value world they are inclined to see Ukraine a part of, forms their attitudes towards the war against Russia, Ukraine's relations with NATO and the EU, imaginary future of their country etc. Hence, in 2024, under the conditions of the war against Russia, during the sociological survey we were able to detect and model statistically manifestations of dominant Euro-Atlantic and minority neutral/uncertain geopolitical identities of the citizens of Ukraine.

Based on the analysis of attainable empirical data we found out that, as of 2024, under the war conditions, the most powerful factor determining various sociocultural orientations of the citizens of Ukraine is their civilization orientation. This factor mostly differentiates the Ukrainian civil community into two parts: 3/4 citizens with Euro-Atlantic and 1/4 citizens with uncertain and/or neutral geopolitical preferences. The majority of citizens with Euro-Atlantic orientation is homogenous by its prevailing geopolitical, geocultural, and language preferences compared with the minority of citizens presently geopolitically uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented. This difference in measure of sociocultural homogeneity of the citizens' preferences can be partially caused by extreme circumstances of the full-scale Russian aggression: Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens received unquestionable confirmation of the correctness of their geopolitical and geocultural orientation, which geopolitically uncertainly and/or neutrally oriented ended up rather disoriented by such a dramatic course of events. Thus, in 2024, absolute majority of Euro-Atlantic-oriented citizens are characterized by higher assessments of psychological resilience of people in their environment, as well as more optimistic predictions of the future of their country, stronger faith in the unity of the Ukrainian people, stronger confidence in Ukraine's victory in the war against Russia etc.

The Russo-Ukrainian war partially restructured the civil community in Ukraine. As a result of the Russian occupation of some Ukrainian territories, their population is excluded to a certain degree from the socio-political space of Ukraine. Numerical proportion changed between various groups of Ukrainian citizens, socioculturally divided due to different language and civilizational preferences. Preference of Ukrainian language and prejudice against Russian language, European geocultural and Euro-Atlantic geopolitical choice gain wider and wider spread among the citizens. But at the same time, alternative sociocultural orientations also remain significantly represented in Ukrainian society in some places. These sociocultural alternatives in Ukraine can become irreconcilable and potentially capable of causing national tensions, divisions, destabilization, and conflicts.

Conclusions

Under the conditions of risks and threats of national tensions, divisions, destabilization, and conflicts, a certain potential for national solidarization and establishment of the Ukrainian society should be seen in attempts to inoculate it with adherence to new, more common and universal, and not particular sociocultural symbols, values, and institutional ideologies. Thus, a search is needed for a novel shared symbolic, value, and ideological base for the present-day Ukrainian national identity, solidarity, and resilience, but only without breaking away from their traditional Ukrainian ethnic principles (the aforementioned breakaway will be perceived by society as a manifestation of national surrender to appease the external aggressor or even excessively politically correct external partners and allies). It seems that a vast innovation potential for symbolic, value, and ideological "rebranding" of national identity, solidarity, and resilience can be tapped by, for example, sociocultural selection, (re)interpretation and codification of dramatic circumstances, heroes, events,

technologies, innovations, mythology, narratives, memes etc. of the present-day heroic resistance against the Russian aggression. Present-day displays of heroic feats by the citizens of Ukraine in the process of fighting off its existential enemy can become factual basis for persuasive ideological justification of conflict-free and non-controversial sociocultural principles of the novel national solidarity and resilience. If this sociocultural potential is successfully realized, we can hope to build and systematize novel shared self-consistent generally legitimate symbolic, value, and ideological “content” of national memory, mythology, and culture.

Naturally, attempts to bring such ambitious plans and hopes to life demand from the representatives of social and behavioral sciences, and also various other spheres of professional activity, to comprehensively think through the possibilities to implement them. The precondition of sociologists’ involvement into such attempts is studying theoretical comprehension and generalizations in scientific sociological literature of the experience of societies who were forced, with a varying degree of success, to partake in a war, to carry-out post-war rebuilding and modernization of their sociocultural codes based on their own national culture and in spite of various unfavourable circumstances. First of all, we talk about post-war societies of North America, Japan, West Germany, South Korea, Israel, Ireland, Taiwan, and others with experience of successful post-war sociocultural modernization, national solidarization, and establishment. Selective theoretical-sociological comprehension of this experience can become a precondition for insightful conceptualizations of similar topical scientific problems of national solidarity and modernization of present-day Ukraine, verification of them in empirical studies, and further formulation of scientifically grounded recommendations to the heads of state, leading civil and political figures. Thus, we plan to conduct further research of the given subject area in directions suggested by dynamics of language, geopolitical, and civilization preferences of the citizens of Ukraine, in order to find out which of these preferences can be unstable and fickle, and which are established and systemically rooted.

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ВОЛОДИМИР РЕЗНІК, ДМИТРО ГЛОМОЗДА

Соціокультурні чинники національної (не)стабільності українського суспільства в умовах війни

На підставі емпіричного аналізу з'ясовано, що в умовах російсько-української війни станом на 2024 рік найпотужнішим чинником, який зумовлює різні соціокультурні орієнтації громадян України, була їхня цивілізаційна зорієнтованість. Здебільшого цей чинник диференціює українську громадянську спільноту на дві частини – 3/4 громадян із євроатлантичними та 1/4 громадян з невизначеними та/або нейтральними геополітичними уподобаннями. Громадянська більшість із євроатлантичною зорієнтованістю була одноріднішою за своїми переважними геополітичними, геокультурними та мовними уподобаннями порівняно з на той час геополітично невизначеною та/або нейтрально зорієнтованою громадянською меншістю. Така відмінність за мірою соціокультурної однорідності громадянських уподобань може бути почасти зумовлена надзвичайними обставинами повномасштабної російської агресії. У 2024 році абсолютній більшості євроатлантично налаштованих українських громадян були властиві вищі оцінки психологічної витривалості людей у своєму оточенні та ефективності української держави за умов війни, оптимістичніші прогнози майбутнього своєї країни, більша віра в єдність народу України, більша впевненість у її перемозі у війні з Росією тощо. Уподобання щодо української мови та упередження щодо російської мови, європейський геокультурний та євроатлантичний геополітичний вибір були домінантними у 2024 році. Але водночас альтернативні соціокультурні орієнтації подекуди теж лишилися вагомо репрезентованими в українському суспільстві. Соціокультурні альтернативи в сучасному українському суспільстві можуть ставати взаємозаперечними та потенційно здатними призводити до національних напружень, розмежувань, дестабілізації та конфліктів.

Ключові слова: соціокультурні чинники, національна стійкість, національна стабільність, війна, геополітичні орієнтації, геокультурні орієнтації, мовні уподобання

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Sociocultural factors of national (in)stability of Ukrainian society in wartime

Based on empirical analysis, it was found that in the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian war as of 2024, the most powerful factor determining the different socio-cultural orientations of Ukrainian citizens was their civilizational orientation. For the most part, this factor differentiates the Ukrainian civil community

into two parts – 3/4 of citizens with Euro-Atlantic and 1/4 of citizens with uncertain and/or neutral geopolitical preferences. The Euro-Atlantic-oriented civic majority was more homogeneous in its prevailing geopolitical, geocultural, and language preferences compared to the then geopolitically undecided and/or neutrally oriented civic minority. Such a difference in the degree of sociocultural homogeneity of civic preferences may be partly due to the extraordinary circumstances of full-scale Russian aggression. In 2024, the absolute majority of Euro-Atlantic-oriented Ukrainian citizens were characterized by higher assessments of the psychological resilience of people in their environment and the effectiveness of the Ukrainian state in war conditions, more optimistic forecasts of their country's future, greater faith in the unity of the people of Ukraine, greater confidence in its victory in the war with Russia, etc. Preference for the Ukrainian language and prejudice against Russian language, European geocultural and Euro-Atlantic geopolitical choices were dominant in 2024. But at the same time, alternative sociocultural orientations were also significantly represented in Ukrainian society in some places. Sociocultural alternatives in modern Ukrainian society can become mutually exclusive and potentially lead to national tensions, divisions, destabilization, and conflicts.

Keywords: sociocultural factors, national resilience, national stability, war, geopolitical orientations, geocultural orientations, language preferences