RODION PRYSHVA,

Master of public management and administration; PhD student at the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Department of History and Theory of Sociology) (12, Shovkovychna St., Kyiv, 01021)

pryshvarodion@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0009-0001-1933-3329

On the methods of the disciplinary stage of social revolution: guerrilla experience in France and Ukraine

A fundamental characteristic of the initial stage of social revolution is the rapid destruction of the *ancien régime's* microphysics. As convincingly demonstrated in the early 20th century by the research of Augustin Cabanès and Lucien Nass (Cabanès, Nass, 1906), as well as Pitirim Sorokin (Sorokin, 1925), this process is accompanied by a widespread decline in public discipline. The authority of norms gives way to the power of anomie, resulting in the proliferation of anomies throughout the social body, rather than disciplines.

Such revolutionary mutations become possible primarily due to the revolutionary forces' dismantling of the old regime's bureaucracy and apparatus of suppression. Societal oversight ceases, and the suppression of various unlawful, anti-government, and anti-social activities becomes either sporadic or entirely absent. This period also sees the delegitimization of the pre-revolutionary form of domination, the collapse of hierarchical systems, and a crisis in the former value system. All these factors create conditions for revolutionary individuals to violate social norms. These individuals arbitrarily begin to demarcate between the permissible and the forbidden (Durkheim, 1926: p. II), which not only amplifies manifestations of revolutionary neurosis but also deepens societal desolidarization.

It's crucial to note, however, that within the power vacuum at both national and regional levels, particular social groups — the subject of research interest for Alexis de Tocqueville (de Tocquevill, 1856), Hippolyte Taine (Taine, 1885), and Augustin Cochin (Cochin, 1921) — begin to seek ways to overcome the prevailing anomie. Encompassing parts of the fragmented social body, these *sociétés de pensée* form the core of factions engaging in a struggle to shape a new social order (Cochin, 1921: pp. 239–244). Characteristically, the higher the level of societal desolidarization, the more such a struggle acquires the features of civil war. In turn, successfully prosecuting this type of conflict demands from the factions' command centers constant support and expan-

---

sion of their own domination over the revolutionized masses. This is achieved through the creation of a disciplinary system designed to enhance the effectiveness of the army, the apparatus of suppression, and the war economy (Weber, 1922: SS. 124–128). Concurrently, tradition and ideology play a significant role here, as they ensure the moral cohesion of these factions.

One well-known phenomenon of civil war is the confrontation between the forces of the new revolutionary order and local guerrilla groups. An examination of the military-theoretical underpinnings of this struggle reveals its interconnectedness with the panoptic model, once meticulously dissected by Michel Foucault. It suffices to recall that, in the French philosopher's view, the domain of panopticism is the realm of irregular bodies (Foucault, 1975: p. 210), which expands maximally during revolutionary anomie.

In this sense, examining anti-guerrilla methods through the lens of the panoptic model is of particular interest. This allows for tracing the mechanisms of pacifying the insurgent field during the disciplinary stage of the revolution. Accordingly, the operation of these mechanisms will be demonstrated through the suppression of the Vendée Uprising (1793–1796) and the establishment of Bolshevik power in Ukraine (1919–1922).

The Core Principles of Anti-Partisan Struggle

While instances of guerrilla actions can be found in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the theoretical conceptualization of this type of warfare only began in the 18th century. During this period, European military thought developed the principles of *petite guerre*. As an important complement to other forms of military effort, such as manoeuvre, open battle, and siege, petty warfare primarily aimed to disrupt the enemy's magazine system, conduct reconnaissance of the theatre of war, and strike at individual enemy detachments and outposts. For example, Maurice de Saxe, a classical military theorist of the first half of the 18th century, advocated for gradually exhausting an enemy constrained by siege operations through small incursions, thereby creating conditions for a successful riposte by the main forces of the active army (de Saxe, 1756: pp. 123–125). This technique of small bleedings, however, demanded from military commanders a thorough knowledge of the terrain, tactical flexibility, and the ability to assemble a detachment from the most capable lower ranks. Among the most notable classical theorists of small war, one could highlight Armand-François de La Croix (de La Croix, 1752), Thomas Auguste de Grandmaison (de Grandmaison, 1758), and the Comte de La Roche (Comte de La Roche, 1770a, b).

Concurrently, across the Atlantic, a more radical form of petty warfare developed, known as *guerre sauvage*. Beginning in the 17th century, small groups of North American Indigenous peoples regularly ambushed colonists and brutally destroyed their frontier settlements and forts (Lee et al., 2021: p. 36). Significantly, while petty warfare on the European continent aimed to undermine the enemy army's combat effectiveness, the actions of Indigenous peoples in the New World severely depleted the colonists' human and economic potential. This considerably complicated the European process of territorial expansion. It's also worth noting several characteristic

features of the North American Indigenous peoples' style of warfare: fighting in familiar geographical conditions, Indigenous groups executed rapid attacks, sought to avoid prolonged campaigns, and strived to minimize casualties (Ibid: pp. 37–39).

The first form, petty warfare, continued to be developed up until the second half of the 19th century, as the nature of European conflicts gravitated towards cabinet wars. Notably, prominent military thinkers such as Philippe de San Juan (de San Juan, 1822), Karl von Decker (von Decker, 1822), Friedrich Wilhelm von Bismarck (von Bismarck, 1820) and Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow (Rüstow, 1864) advanced the theory of petty warfare. Nevertheless, against the backdrop of intensifying colonial expansion, European military circles urgently faced the challenge of finding effective methods to combat indigenous populations whose operational methods mirrored those of the Indian Wars. This spurred the development of anti-partisan action theory, the foundations of which were laid in the late 19th century by Sir Charles Edward Callwell (Callwell, 1899).

The subsequent 20th century was marked not only by two total wars but also became an era of permanent guerrilla warfare, erupting in various parts of the world. From South Africa to Latin America, and from North Africa to Siberia — everywhere, against a backdrop of increasing socio-political instability, one could observe fierce confrontations between partisans and regular military units.

Initially, knowledge concerning this form of warfare was largely the domain of commanders such as Lawrence of Arabia, Mao Zedong, and Ernesto Che Guevara, as well as lesser-known military figures. These individuals were frequently compelled to discover methods of countering their *vis-à-vis* in the form of insurgent leaders through trial and error. However, from the mid-20th century onwards, this practical knowledge became the subject of profound academic reflection. To this day, there remains a sustained interest in the study of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla actions, particularly within the synthesis of military theory and the social sciences. Among the most significant contributions to this field are works by William Pomeroy (Pomeroy, 1968), Walter Laqueur (Laqueur, 1977), Robin Corbett (Corbett, 1986), Anthony James Joes (Joes, 1996), James Arnold (Arnold, 2009) and Benjamin Swenson (Swenson, 2023).

Guerrilla warfare itself should be classified as a form of non-trinitarian warfare, characterized by a disruption of the equilibrium among the elements of Carl von Clausewitz's trinity (van Creveld, 1991: pp. 49–57). In such conflicts, the government and the army are compelled to contend with insurgents who are deeply integrated with the social body. During periods of political stability, this struggle manifests as a confrontation between intelligence agencies and revolutionary groups. Conversely, during times of social revolution, particularly during civil wars, the forces of order must engage in full-scale and often extremely fierce combat operations against partisan formations. From the perspective of this study, a detailed examination of the second case is required.

Accordingly, the government faces the emergence of a localized insurgent field. Its key actors are the partisans themselves, along with the civilian population, which can be further categorized as sympathetic, indifferent, and, to a lesser extent, hostile towards the armed rebels. Possessing intimate knowledge of the terrain and the local community — in other words, mastering the microphysics of their natural environ-

ment — guerrillas gain the ability to extend and wield power within specific territories. This, however, necessitates finding the optimal organizational structure for the resistance movement, developing mechanisms for overseeing both the local community and the adversary, conducting extensive ideological and cultural work among the population, establishing a supply system for partisan formations, and continuously refining tactics and devising a strategy for anti-government actions (Zedong, 1992: p. 351). Should these conditions be met, the insurgents establish a regime of asymmetry within the controlled territory. Upon entering such a zone, government forces find themselves in an absolute fog of war, where every element of the insurgent field — whether natural or social — constitutes an object of the partisans' active knowledge. Thus, a *polyopticon* is formed within the rebellious territory[1], allowing attempts at government invasion to be countered through solidary observation of the terrain (Felstead et al., 2005: pp. 82–85).

Significantly, in his lecture "National and Class Strategy", delivered on December 24, 1919, at the Red Army General Staff Academy, Commander Mikhail Tukhachevsky noted that only the rapid occupation of a rebellious region — before an insurgent army could form within its borders — ensured the suppression of the aforementioned asymmetry and minimized the potential threat of a localized resistance movement escalating into a full-blown civil war faction (Tukhachevsky, 1964: pp. 33–37). As Mao Zedong observed, the latter strives to transform controlled territories into regions of "progress and light" and extend its activities into the enemy's rear — areas of "backwardness and darkness". In the context of anti-partisan operations, such a war acquires a *jigsaw pattern* with pockets of rebellion and order, and typically unfolds in two distinct phases (Zedong, 1992: p. 351).

In the initial phase, regular forces often adopt an annihilation strategy, aiming to neutralize the rebel's combatants. Paradoxically, this approach tends to entangle government forces in a protracted war of attrition against mobile guerrilla groups deeply embedded within the local populace (Paul, 1994: pp. 24–30). Moreover, the impulse to decisively eliminate dispersed insurgents *d'un seul coup* results in a geographical fragmentation of the regular army's efforts across various pockets of resistance, consequently impeding their ability to firmly establish control within the rebellious territory. Any success achieved by government forces at this stage of the conflict is highly contingent. For example, even if they manage to occupy specific areas of the rebellious zone, the regular army's communication lines will remain under

---

[1] The concept of the polyopticon was introduced by Alan Felstead, Nick Jewson, and Sally Walters in their work Changing Places of Work. In their research on modern office spaces, they concluded: "The polyopticon, then, entails the potentiality for all-round, 360-degree, observation by both senior and junior co-workers at all times. Whereas the panopticon institutionalized centralized vision by figures of authority, the polyopticon entails decentralized visibility by all and sundry. As one respondent remarked: it's a goldfish bowl" (Felstead et al., 2005: pp. 84). In the context of guerrilla warfare, the traditional office environment is replaced by a specific geographical zone, typically rural. Within this zone, local residents provide comprehensive support to the guerrillas, supplying them with information, provisions, and shelter. This widespread assistance allows insurgents not only "to see" their operational area but also to effectively utilize it for their objectives. This dynamic logically aligns with Mao Zedong's assertion that "guerrilla fighters should feel like a fish in water".

constant threat. Conversely, the defeat of large insurgent formations is frequently incomplete rebels can literally dissolve into the local environment, replenish their supplies and ranks using local resources, and subsequently initiate a new phase of the struggle. Often, the functioning of a rebel polyopticon leads to a state of moral disequilibrium within government forces' command. As a result, they resort to a disciplinary method of terror (Sorokin, 1925: p. 39), targeting civilians suspected of supporting the insurgents.

The limited efficacy of this method was observed as early as by Gustave Le Bon. Critiquing the Bismarckian principle — which posited that war must be made so horrific for civilians that they would plead for peace — the French social psychologist rightly concluded that prolonged terror merely engenders hatred for the invaders and a desire to fight them to the bitter end (Le Bon, 1916: pp. 291–293). It is crucial to add that the resolve to continue resistance is further amplified by the inability of government forces to firmly establish themselves in the area. Disciplinary techniques other than executions are either not yet implemented or are only being developed as isolated initiatives. Consequently, the population and the partisans do not perceive the iron hand of order. In these circumstances, terror should be viewed as an attempt to assert authority over the social body without acquiring knowledge about it. This method is realized through public or clandestine executions, wherein the physical elimination of individuals from the insurgent domain acts as both an act of extermination and a display of state authority. Fundamentally, this terror straightforwardly seeks to establish a power asymmetry beneficial to government troops.

Conversely, the second phase of counter-partisan warfare sees government forces shift towards a strategy of attrition. As Hans Delbrück posited, a military commander adopting this approach acknowledges a balance of power, thus aiming not to annihilate the adversary but rather to wear them down through various attacks, thereby compelling them to accept moderate terms (Delbrück, 1920: S. 334). The central question in a strategy of attrition is how to inflict damage upon the enemy while minimizing risks to one's own army and populace. In the context of counter-partisan operations and Foucault's ideas, this question can be rephrased: Which disciplinary methods enable the most effective economy of power within rebellious territory? Or, to simplify entirely: How can the power asymmetry be restored in favour of the government? Figuratively, the answer is that the insurgent body requires not terror, but a straitjacket.

Delbrück noted that in a strategy of attrition, particular emphasis is placed on the capture or defence of fortresses, which historically secured dominance over specific areas (Delbrück, 1920: S. 501). From the perspective of counter-partisan operations, a fortress or any fortified position represents a disciplinary point — a space isolated from the polyopticon, serving as a base for observing and suppressing the insurgent field. The challenge, however, lies in the fact that during the first phase of counter-partisan actions, the functionality of such strongholds is severely hampered by the jigsaw pattern of the conflict. Government forces are dispersed, their supply lines are under threat, disciplinary mechanisms are underdeveloped, and insurgents fiercely resist regular forces.

Significant shifts, however, occur during the second phase of the confrontation when government forces address the jigsaw pattern by employing the method of

cordon placement for disciplinary points (Joes, 2004: pp. 60, 100, 223). The dense line of panoptic objects thus created establishes a clear demarcation between the areas of rebellion and order, effectively placing insurgent bodies under military-social quarantine (Foucault, 1975: p. 217). The density of this arrangement enhances the capacity for panoptic vision, enabling forces of order to more effectively acquire knowledge about the intervals between strongholds. Similarly, regular units can respond more swiftly to any tactical challenges within these intervals.

As a result, the rebellious areas, which once constituted a fog of war and the foundation of the polyopticon, now come under continuous surveillance, classification, and evaluation - in other words, government forces are constantly scrutinizing the areas entrusted to them (Foucault, 1975: pp. 186–187). Technically, the disciplining of these intervals occurs through constant patrolling, targeted elimination of partisan groups, the establishment of an intelligence network for gathering information about the local community, and finally, collaboration with civilians, their disarmament, or expulsion from the rebellious territory (Small Unit Tactics, 1964: pp. 292–295). This process gradually separates the civilian population from the insurgents, thereby diminishing the guerrillas' capacity to resist government forces (Arnold, 2009: pp. 246–248). In essence, the polyopticon is dismantled by the panopticon. Just as a straitjacket slowly suppresses a patient's will to resist, a disciplinary cordon methodically advancing through insurgent territory systematically pacifies the rebellious spirit.

In conclusion, counter-insurgency warfare represents a evolution from the fanatical principle of "*caedite eos*" to the rational principle of "*definite eos*": the infernal invasion, characterized by its executions of civilians, is replaced by a pacifying infiltration that effectively separates the insurgent from the civilian. In essence, guerrilla warfare is a struggle for power asymmetry over the hearts and minds of a specific geographical area. Success in this conflict directly depends on a side's ability to penetrate the fabric of the local social body and methodically envelop it through disciplines. For this reason, the solidarity based polyopticon will inevitably be superseded by the panopticon and the critical question remains which of the two sides in the guerrilla conflict will first achieve this state.

On the Stages of Insurgency Suppression in France and Ukraine

An examination of the history of the Vendée Uprising and the peasant rebellions in Ukraine readily reveals similarities in the counter-insurgency approaches adopted by Republican forces and the Bolsheviks, respectively. This congruence should not be surprising, as Bolshevik leaders were significantly influenced by the French Revolution and adapted its experiences to the conditions of the 1917–1921 Russian Civil War.

The Vendée Uprising erupted in March 1793 on the left bank of the Loire, encompassing Anjou, and both Upper and Lower Poitou. This region was truly unique: geographically, it presented an ideal terrain for guerrilla warfare, characterized by a forested landscape interspersed with ravines and hollows, along with salt marshes and small canals; socio-structurally, it was fertile ground for counter-revolutionary sentiments: the local peasantry maintained strong spiritual and economic ties with

their priests and seigneurs, even continuing to faithfully fulfill feudal obligations long after their official abolition. It is therefore unsurprising that when the Revolution introduced the *levée en masse* and persecution of the Catholic clergy to this region, with its entrenched patriarchal-feudal order, the local community revolted (Thiers, 1866: pp. 502–503).

During the first phase of the Vendée War (April 1793 — February 1795), Republican forces failed to suppress the initial outbreaks of rebellion. This led to the formation of localized insurgent units, which subsequently coalesced into the Catholic and Royal Army. For over half a year, the rebels engaged the forces of revolutionary order with fluctuating success. The Republican army, dispersed across a vast territory, conducted poorly planned concentric offensives that proved ineffective in decisively defeating the Vendéen formations (de Pétigny, 1908: pp. 236–237). Conversely, the Vendéens, relying on local resources and maintaining strong internal cohesion, launched counterattacks that demoralized their adversaries. Only after the defeat at Cholet on October 15, 1793, was a portion of the Catholic Army forced to abandon its primary operational area and open a new theatre of war on the right bank of the Loire.

The insurgent actions of the Vendéens provoked a severe response from the authorities. Between November 1793 and February 1794, Commissioner Jean-Baptiste Carrier initiated a terror campaign in Nantes against "enemies of the Revolution". Concurrently, military revolutionary commissions began operating, summarily sentencing to death participants of the rebellion who had been routed at Le Mans (December 12–13, 1793) and Savenay (December 23, 1793) (Wallon, 1889: p. 408). However, the most extreme manifestation of this terror policy was the offensive of General Louis Marie Turreau's *colonnes infernales* from January to May 1794: twelve columns crisscrossed the Vendée concentrically, annihilating local inhabitants, including women and children, and setting ablaze villages, hamlets, forests, and heathlands (Stofflet, 1875: pp. 173–179, 201–205). These direct actions did not suppress the rebellion; instead, they merely intensified the local population's resolve to continue the fight under the leadership of commanders from the Catholic Army who had survived the *virée de Galerne*. The war thus persisted, and even the signing of the peace treaty at La Jaunaye on February 17, 1795, failed to halt hostilities.

The second phase of the Vendée War, from June 1795 to June 1796, is significantly associated with the Republican General Lazare Hoche. A gifted commander, Hoche possessed a keen understanding of his adversaries' psychology, which enabled him to pacify the breakaway region relatively swiftly.

Primarily, Hoche encircled the Sèvre and Loire region with a system of forts, between which regular patrols were conducted. This cordon effectively prevented rebel forces from passing through, and ahead of this line, mobile detachments were positioned to rapidly engage any large insurgent formations. Furthermore, wisely discerning that the Vendéens prioritized their livestock and crops over the cause of fighting the Republic, Hoche ordered his soldiers to observe every village and hamlet to seize livestock, grain, and arrest influential residents. Only upon the surrender of firearms were the peasants' provisions and animals returned, and hostages released. Concurrently, an active engagement with priests was undertaken: recognizing their crucial role in the social fabric of the rebellious region, Hoche commanded his forces

to establish trusting relationships with the clergy, partly to gain confidential intelligence on the rebels. Similarly, support was extended to the impoverished peasantry, who received grain and livestock to develop their farms (Thiers, 1838: pp. 362–364). Gradually, this pacifying cordon advanced across the Vendée, allowing Hoche to win the hearts and minds of the region's inhabitants, thereby undermining support for the insurgents. By the end of June 1796, the Vendée Uprising was suppressed.

Turning to Ukraine, significant outbreaks of rebellion occurred from the summer of 1918 to April 1922. It's important to note that Ukraine's territory was equally conducive to partisan warfare. The northern mixed forest zone, ideal for ambushes and offering cover for insurgents, transitions into a steppe zone that demanded high mobility from rebel detachments. Moreover, the Ukrainian peasant, inherently an individualistic proprietor and a veteran of the First World War, was prone to rebellious sentiments at any encroachment on their land or labour products (Savchenko, 2011: pp. 7–13).

In 1917, these peasants divided the landowners' land, yet by the following year, they rose against their former masters who began restoring their estates after Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky's government was established, supported by German-Austrian interventionists. Crucially, the Germans were keen on re-establishing large-scale landownership, as this was their only means of obtaining essential foodstuffs from Ukraine for the starving populations of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Zvenyhorod-Tarashcha Uprising, which engulfed the southern Kyiv Governorate, epitomized peasant resistance. Up to 40,000 individuals took up arms, initiating the liquidation of the Hetmanate administration. Approximately 6,000 of them managed to break through the encirclement set up by the Ukrainian State Guard and German forces. These insurgents then crossed the Dnieper River and proceeded to the neutral zone on the border with the RSFSR, where the Bolsheviks utilized them to form partisan detachments (Hrytskevych, 2011: pp. 133–134).

It is important, however, not to assume that Bolshevik leaders were inclined to satisfy peasant aspirations. Following their seizure of Ukraine between January and June 1919, the Bolsheviks implemented a policy of War Communism, which included *prodrazvyorstka* (grain requisitioning) enforced by committees of the poor. This "crusade for bread", as Lenin termed it (Ibid: p. 201), met with resolute resistance from the numerous prosperous Ukrainian peasantries. Consequently, the insurgent movement, more widely known as *atamanshchyna*, spread across the Podolian, Kyiv, Poltava, and Katerynoslav Governorates. This marked the commencement of the first phase of the Bolsheviks' struggle against Ukrainian partisans (Savchenko, 2011: pp. 94–96, 99–101, 104–106, 108).

It should be noted that during this period, the Bolsheviks found themselves in a situation analogous to that of the Republicans during the initial stage of suppressing the Vendée Uprising: Red Army forces were dispersed throughout Ukraine, rendering their numbers insufficient to liquidate all pockets of resistance. Significantly, even after suppressing the large-scale rebellion led by Nykyfor Hryhoriiv, the Bolsheviks faced a military crisis: Red Army was disintegrating, and work in rural areas became impossible due to the widespread and extreme ferocity of peasant uprisings (Hrytskevych, 2011: pp. 235–237).

Nevertheless, characterized by a drive for organization, the Bolshevik leadership, even at this early stage of the conflict, laid the groundwork for their eventual victory. This involved establishing an extensive network of extraordinary commissions, which effectively functioned as disciplinary points. The personnel of these institutions engaged in a wide array of activities aimed at solidifying the Bolshevik regime: they specifically combated speculation and criminal elements, conducted investigative and surveillance operations, and participated in punitive actions against partisans. This work was further augmented by extreme, almost bestial, cruelty towards suspects. The clearly localized "*chekist interrogation chambers*" often induced a state of terror within the local community, which, combined with the methodical operations of these commissions, psychologically undermined the population's capacity for resistance (Red Terror, 2013: pp. 256–270).

In Kyiv, for instance, the commission led by General Fyodor Rerberg reported that approximately 12,000 individuals were killed between late July and late August 1919 (local residents estimated the figure at 30,000–40,000). Eyewitnesses recounted discovering gruesome scenes within the premises of one of Kyiv's Cheka facilities, including hooks with hanged corpses, mutilated bodies bearing carved crosses or "epaulettes", or even entirely flayed skin. Reports also circulated of a severed head preserved in a jar of alcohol (Red Terror, 2010: p. 80). In Chernihiv, 500 individuals were killed between December 30, 1918, and September 28, 1919, with the majority being prosperous peasants who had demonstrated defiance and various forms of resistance to the communists (Ibid: p. 88). Equally horrific events transpired in Odesa, which Red Army units entered on April 6, 1919. By the end of May, the Extraordinary Commission had already arrested 1,114 people. Another 1,800 individuals were arrested in June, and a new wave of arrests occurred in July when the Bolsheviks officially declared the Red Terror. According to eyewitness accounts, 2,200 people were killed in May, June, and July (Red Terror, 2013: p. 154). A wide array of torture methods was employed as means of intimidation, including burying people alive and placing them on pots with hungry rats.

The subsequent phase of Ukraine's pacification (January 1920 – April 1922) synthesized the method of terror with elements of pacification *à la* Hoche. Due to the redeployment of forces from other fronts of the Civil War, the Bolsheviks were able to direct more Red Army units towards combating the atamanshchyna as early as the first half of 1920. Furthermore, in May 1920, Felix Dzerzhinsky, the head of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, personally arrived in Ukraine with 1,400 of his personnel to suppress the insurgent movement. They orchestrated a new wave of repressions, resulting in tens of thousands of peasants being executed in the Katerynoslav Governorate, an area where Nestor Makhno's partisans were active. It is also significant that the Bolsheviks mobilized 15,000 ideologically aligned workers into food requisitioning detachments in Ukraine (Hrytskevych, 2011: pp. 339–340). Finally, special operations were conducted to eliminate partisan detachments and their leaders, primarily employing the tactic of internal cordons, wherein rebellious areas were encircled by large formations (Savchenko, 2006: pp. 380–384).

These measures to strengthen the Bolshevik military-police presence in Ukraine were complemented by other techniques aimed at pacifying the population. For

instance, to divide the peasantry, committees of "nezazhitochni" (non-prosperous) peasants were organized in place of the committees of the poor. These new committees included not only farm laborers and the destitute but also "seredniaky" (middle peasants). By empowering these structures with the right to allocate land and inventory to landless peasants, the Bolsheviks successfully expanded their social base in the Ukrainian countryside (Hrytskevych, 2011: pp. 341–342). Subsequently, in February March 1921, a resolution was passed granting amnesty to all who had fought against Soviet power, provided that former insurgents became loyal citizens of the Ukrainian SSR (Ibid: p. 515). As a direct result of these combined efforts, the Bolsheviks succeeded in suppressing the atamanshchyna by June 1922 (Savchenko, 2011: pp. 355–356).

In summary, while there are similarities in the development of counter-insurgency operations in the Vendée and Ukraine, it is crucial to acknowledge significant differences. Specifically, General Hoche's methods in the Vendée were primarily aimed at pacifying the rebellious region. Hoche, known for his benevolent disposition, based his disciplinary cordon on the principle of cooperation with the rebels, intending to win their sympathies.

In stark contrast, the Bolsheviks, as heirs to the Jacobins, fused the method of terror with the disciplinary cordon, further intensifying this synthesis with the technique of non-public executions. Thus, reprisals against perceived enemies of the regime were not merely systematic and widespread but also devoid of the theatricality characteristic of the French Revolution. Individuals "disappeared" into the dungeons of the extraordinary commissions. These disciplinary strongholds evolved into Kafkaesque castles that, as it were, "offered not the slightest glimmer of light". Information regarding the non-public executions carried out within them disseminated through the surrounding areas via rumors and brief press notices, fostering an atmosphere of oppressive uncertainty that psychologically paralyzed rebellious impulses[1]. It is important to note that these actions were reinforced by a continuous increase in the density of the military-police apparatus.

In essence, General Hoche gently permeated the microphysics of the rebellious community, aiming to eliminate the desire for opposition to authority without eradicating the distinct identity of the Vendéans. Conversely, the Bolsheviks conducted a full-scale invasion targeting the physical and ideological suppression of Ukrainian society, encompassing both urban and rural populations.

---

[1] These statements were formed under the impression of the memories of people who survived the Red Terror, as well as Vladimir Zarubin's book "The Splinter" (1923), which he wrote after conducting interviews with employees of the extraordinary commissions. Here are the words this writer put into the mouth of his character, the Chekist Srubov: "In France, there was the guillotine, public executions. We have the cellar. Execution is secret. Public executions surround the death of a criminal, even the most formidable, with an aura of martyrdom, heroism. Public executions agitate, giving moral strength to the enemy. Public executions leave relatives and loved ones with a corpse, a grave, last words, a last will, an exact date of death. The executed person, as it were, is not completely destroyed. Secret execution, in the cellar, without any external effects, without announcing the verdict, sudden, has an overwhelming effect on enemies. A huge, merciless, all-seeing machine unexpectedly seizes its victims and grinds them up like in a meat grinder. After the execution, there is no exact day of death, no last words, no corpse, not even a grave. Emptiness. The enemy is completely annihilated".

Conclusions

To summarize, the Panoptic model has been de facto integrated into the framework of counter-insurgency operations, significantly enhancing their effectiveness (Foucault, 1975: p. 208). Indeed, only by achieving the Panopticon's core effect - bringing the insurgent into a state of conscious and constant visibility (Foucault, 1975: p. 202) — can the insurgent field be suppressed. This is accomplished through the implementation of a military-social cordon method: a network of disciplinary points physically isolates the rebellious zone, allowing state forces to progressively examine the social body and dismantle the polyopticon. Consequently, the cordon advances through knowledge and the density of combined arms, gradually diminishing the insurgents' capacity for effective resistance. The asymmetry of power is thus restored in favor of the forces of order.

However, researchers must now critically re-evaluate guerrilla theory and the capacity of insurgents to effectively resist state forces. The dominance of drones over the battlefield is not only altering the nature of interstate conflicts but also, it appears, significantly diminishing the insurgent capabilities of developed societies. It is plausible that the form of guerrilla warfare known in the 20th century will become exclusive to areas where state forces are unable to fully equip themselves with unmanned aerial systems. Conversely, it is also conceivable that insurgency will evolve into a form of special operations conducted by technologically advanced states within enemy territories.

In this context, guerrilla warfare no longer represents the intent of local revolutionary forces; instead, it merely becomes an element of a meticulously developed strategy, thereby reacquiring the characteristics of a small war that it once lost.

References

Arnold, J.R. (2009). *Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq*. New York: Bloomsbury.

Cabanès, A., Nass, L. (1906). *La Névrose révolutionnaire*. Paris: Société française d'imprimerie et de librairie.

Callwell, C.E. (1899). *Small Wars Their Principles and Practice.* London: Harrison and Sons.

Cochin, A. (1921). *Les sociétés de pensée et la démocratie: Études tudes d'histoire révolutionnaire.* Paris: Plon-Nourrit.

Comte de La Roche. (1770a). *Essai sur la petite guerre* (T. I). Paris: Chez Saillant & Nyon.

Comte de La Roche, (1770b). *Essai sur la petite guerre* (T. II). Paris: Chez Saillant & Nyon.

Corbett, R. (1968). *Guerrilla Warfare: From 1939 to the Present Day*. London: Guild Publishing.

de Grandmaison, T.-A. (1758). *La petite guerre: ou traité du service des troupes légères en campagne*. Francfort, Leipsic: Chez Knoch & Esslinger.

de La Croix, A.-F. (1752). *Traité de la petite guerre pour les compagnies franches*. Paris: Antoine Boudet.

de Pétigny, X. (1908). *Un bataillon de volontaires (3e bataillon de Maine-et-Loire), 1792–1796*. Angers: Germain et g. Grassin.

de San Juan, F. (1822). *Instruccion de guerrilla*. Lima: Imprenta del Río.

de Saxe, M. (1756). *Les Reveries ou Memoires sur l'art de la guerre de Maurice comte de Saxe*. Haye: chez Pierre Gosse Junior.

de Tocquevill, A. (1856). *L'ancien régime et la révolution*. Paris: Michel Levy Frères.

Delbrück, H. (1920). *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte: Die Neuzeit* (Bd. IV). Berlin: Verlag Stilke.

Durkheim, É. (1926). *De la division du travail social*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan.

Felstead, A., Jewson, N., Walters, S. (2005). *Changing Places of Work*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Foucault, M. (1975). *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison*. Paris: Gallimard.

Joes, A.J. (1996). *Guerilla Conflict before the Cold War*. Westport: Praeger.

Joes, A.J. (2004). *Resisting rebellion: the history and politics of counterinsurgency*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.

Laqueur, W. (1977). *Guerrilla: a historical and critical study*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Le Bon, G. (1916). *Enseignements psychologiques de la guerre européenne*. Paris: Ernest Flammarion.

Lee, W.E., Anthony E. Carlson, A.E., Preston, D.L., Silbey, D. (2021). *The Other Face of Battle: America's Forgotten Wars and the Experience of Combat*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Paul, T.V. (1994). *Asymmetric conflicts: war initiation by weaker powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pomeroy, W.T. (1968). *Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism*. New York: International Publishers.

Rüstow, F.W. (1864). *Die Lehre vom kleinen Kriege*. Zürich: Druck und Verlag von Friedrich Schultheß.

Small Unit Tactics, Including Communications. (1964). Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Sorokin, P. (1925). *The Sociology of Revolution*. Philadelphia, London: J.B. Lippincott Company.

Stofflet, E. (1875). *Stofflet et la Vendée*. Paris: E. Plon et Cie.

Swenson, B.J. (2023). *The Dawn of Guerrilla Warfare: Why the Tactics of Insurgents against Napoleon failed in the US Mexican War*. Barnsley: Pen and Sword.

Taine, H. (1885). *Les origines de la France contemporaine. La Révolution: La Conquête jacobine* (T. II). Paris: Librairie Hachette.

Thiers, M.A. (1838). *Histoire de la Révolution française* (T. III). Paris: Furne, Jouvet et Cie; Bruxelles: Meline, Cans et Compagnie.

Thiers, M.A. (1866). *Histoire de la Révolution française* (T. I). Paris: Furne, Jouvet et Cie.

van Creveld, M. (1991). *The transformation of war*. New York: Free Press.

von Bismarck, F.W. (1820). *Feld Dienst der Reuterey vom Verfasser ber Vorlesungen über die Taktik der Reuterey*. Karlsruhe: C.F. Müllers Hofbuchhandlung.

von Decker, C. (1822). *Der kleine Krieg, im Geiste der neueren Kriegführung*. Berlin; Posen: Ernst Siegfried Mittler.

Wallon, H.A. (1889). *Les représentants du peuple en mission et la justice révolutionnaire dans les départements en l'an II: La Vendée* (1793–1794). Paris: Librairie Hachette Et Cie.

Weber, M. (1922). *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Abt. III)*. Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck.

Zedong, M. (1992). *Mao's road to power: Revolutionary Writings 1912–1949: The New Stage, August 1937–1938* (Vol. VI). New York; London: M.E. Sharpe.

Hrytskevych, A. (2011). *The struggle for Ukraine, 1917–1921*. [In Russian]. Minsk: Sovremennaia Shkola. [=Грицкевич, А. (2011). *Борьба за Украину, 1917–1921*. Минск: Современная школа, 2011.]

Red Terror in the South of Russia. (2013). [In Russian]. Moscow: AIRIS-Press. [=*Красный террор на Юге России*. (2013). Москва: Айрис-пресс.]

Red Terror through the Eyes of Eyewitnesses. (2010). [In Russian]. Moscow: AIRIS-Press. [=*Красный террор глазами очевидцев*. (2010). Москва: Айрис-пресс.]

Savchenko, V. (2006). *Twelve wars for Ukraine*. [In Russian]. Kharkiv: Folio. [=Савченко, В. (2006). *Двенадцать войн за Украину*. Харьков: Фолио.]

Savchenko, V. (2011). *Atamanshchyna*. [In Russian]. Kharkiv: Folio. [=Савченко, В. (2011). *Атаманщина*. Харьков: Фолио.]

Tukhachevsky, M. (1964). *Selected works: 1919–1927* (Vol. 1). [In Russian]. Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. [=Тухачевский, М. (1964). *Избранные произведения: 1919–1927 гг.* (Т. I). Москва: Военное издательство Министерства обороны СССР.]

РОДІОН ПРИШВА

Про методи дисциплінарного етапу революції: досвід ґерильї у Франції та Україні

У статті розглядається процес становлення дисциплінарної системи в рамках контрпартизанських операцій на прикладі придушення Вандейського повстання (1793–1796) та боротьби із селянським опором на території України у 1918–1922 роках. Центральна увага приділяється концепції паноптикуму М. Фуко, яка інтерпретується як модель трансформації повстанського простору зі стану «поліоптикуму» — режиму взаємного спостереження та підтримки між повстанцями та місцевим населенням — у режим централізованого нагляду та придушення (паноптикуму). Автор демонструє, як в умовах революційної аномії та громадянської війни створюються нові форми владного контролю: військові, ідеологічні та поліцейські структури поступово перехоплюють ініціативу у повстанців, ізолюючи населення від партизанських формувань та формуючи «дисциплінарний кордон». Порівняльний аналіз показує як м'які форми впливу (у випадку генерала Гоша у Франції), так і жорсткі — характерні для практики більшовиків, що поєднують терор та адміністративно-поліцейський контроль. У статті підкреслюється, що успіх у боротьбі з партизанами залежить не тільки від сили апарату примусу, а й від здатності держави проникнути у мікрофізику повсякденного життя, нав'язавши свою сітку спостереження, нормалізації та управління. Насамкінець обговорюються перспективи розвитку партизанської війни в умовах технологічних змін, особливо у зв'язку з поширенням безпілотних систем спостереження, що ставлять під сумнів стійкість традиційного повстанського потенціалу у високотехнологічних суспільствах.
Ключові слова: ґерилья, мала війна, партизани, Мішель Фуко, Мао Цзедун, Лазар Гош, Ленін, Ганс Дельбрюк, Махно, Вандея, червоний терор, кордонна стратегія, революція, отаманщина, чекісти, громадянська війна, паноптикум, поліоптикум

RODION PRYSHVA

On the methods of the disciplinary stage of social revolution: guerrilla experience in France and Ukraine

The article examines the process of the disciplinary system's formation within counter-insurgency operations, using the suppression of the Vendée uprising (1793–1796) and the fight against peasant resistance in Ukraine in 1918–1922 as examples. Central attention is given to M. Foucault's concept of the panopticon, which is interpreted as a model for the transformation of insurgent space from a state of "polyopticon" — a regime of mutual observation and support between insurgents and the local population — into a regime of centralized surveillance and suppression. The author demonstrates how, in conditions of revolutionary anomie and civil war, new forms of power control are created: military, ideological, and police structures gradually seize the initiative from the insurgents, isolating the population from partisan formations and forming a "disciplinary cordon". Comparative analysis reveals both soft forms of influence (as in the case of General Hoche in France) and harsh forms — characteristic of Bolshevik practices combining terror and administrative-police control (panopticon). The work

emphasizes that success in combating guerrillas depends not only on the strength of the coercive apparatus but also on the state's ability to penetrate the microphysics of everyday life, imposing its network of surveillance, normalization, and control. In conclusion, the article discusses the prospects for the development of guerrilla warfare in the context of technological changes, especially concerning the proliferation of unmanned surveillance systems, which call into question the sustainability of traditional insurgent potential in high-tech societies.